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1. Introduction 
 
Standard economic theory is based on the concepts of self-interest, rationality and 
utility maximization (Wilkinson, 2008, p. 5). From this point of view cooperation only 
occurs if the benefit outweighs the cost. However, cooperative behavior and 
cooperation are fundamental concepts vital for society. People have to work together 
and rely on each other in any society, culture and age. Especially modern societies 
strongly depend on cooperation between strangers.  
People pay taxes although tax evasion is possible and buy bus tickets although 
controls are rare. People contribute to society, although their contribution does not 
count. Society would not collapse if one person does not pay taxes. The self-
interested, rational and utility maximizing “homo oeconomicus” would not fit in this 
society. He would not pay taxes or buy bus tickets, because he benefits more from 
the money than society does.  
This raises the question if the standard economic models are wrong. Maybe people 
are not rational, self-interested and utility maximizing. The concept of the “homo 
oeconomicus” has therefore been challenged by a number of new approaches from 
other scientific fields. 
This thesis will discuss three interdisciplinary approaches: Psychological knowledge 
of behavior is incorporated in the theory of behavioral economics. Neuroeconomics 
combines neuroscience with economics and tries to find answers on the neural level. 
The third approach of genoeconomics reminds us that genes have to be taken into 
account and wants to find out, how much of our behavior is carved into our genes 
and how much we can shape by living. 
The aim of this thesis is to show that economics can benefit from interdisciplinary 
approaches in the form of new theories, methods and ways of thinking.  
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2. Cooperative behavior in the light of behavioral 
economics 
 
2.1. Aim of behavioral economics 
 
Behavioral economics tries to answer economic questions by incorporating 
psychological knowledge into economic theories. Self-interest and utility 
maximization is one of the main-characteristics of the so-called homo oeconomicus. 
People are thought to maximize their own benefit without caring about others. In the 
last decades, however, a large number of experiments showed that this is not 
necessarily the case. Behavioral economics tries to find out why such discrepancies 
between standard economic theory and actual human behavior exist and why people 
cooperate when standard economics would assume otherwise. In this chapter 
different behavioral economic methods and current findings will be discussed to show 
how behavioral economics can contribute to economic research of cooperation. 
 
2.2. From standard economic theory to behavioral economics 
 
Before the strict division of economics and psychology, economists often contributed 
theories to psychology. Adam Smith for example wrote besides his famous “The 
Wealth of Nations” the book “The Theory of Moral Sentiments”, in which he 
discussed human behavior from a psychological point of view (Camerer, Loewenstein 
and Rabin, 2004, p. 5). 
This “drifting apart” of psychology and economics started at the beginning of the 20th 
century. At this time economists wanted to transform economics into a natural 
science, whereas in psychology Freud’s theory was very popular (Camerer, 
Loewenstein and Rabin, 2004, p. 5). His theory was not like a natural science at all, 
because introspection and interpretation of dreams cannot be part of a natural 
science. Natural science focuses on observable phenomena which can be measured 
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and reproduced by an independent person. Different opinions on science led to the 
drifting apart of economics and psychology. 
The gap between the two sciences became smaller again as behaviorism became 
more popular in psychology. Psychologists like Watson, Thorndike and Skinner were 
also only interested in human behavior because all behavior can be changed by 
learning and therefore intentions are neglectable (Sternberg, 2009, p. 8). 
The differences between the two disciplines increased again as soon as cognitive 
psychology became the leading paradigm in psychology, because then intentions 
and motivations became important for psychology. Behavior was no more just a 
reaction to the environment but the human mind creates and actively changes the 
impression of the environment and therefore cannot be neglected any longer. Not 
only behavior itself is therefore important and this is a main difference to economics, 
where observable actions and shown preferences count.  
Behavioral economics tries to close this gap by using psychological knowledge to 
solve economic problems and to improve economic theories. Simon (1956) was the 
first to try to break the basic assumption of rationality in neoclassical economics. He 
made the term “bounded rationality” popular, which means that humans are not able 
to be rational due to cognitive limitations. Kahneman and Tversky showed that we 
are all prone to cognitive biases and use heuristics due to for example complexity or 
time pressure which may lead us in the wrong direction. 
Behavioral economics assumes that humans don not only want to maximize their 
own utility, but also their utility in relation to others. People have so-called other-
regarding preferences like reciprocity, fairness and altruism. This approach does not 
assume that standard economics is wrong but it wants to extend the standard theory 
of rational choice (Ho, Lim & Camerer, 2006). Common methods to prove other-
regarding preferences and prosocial behavior are experiments and games. 
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2.3. Experiments in behavioral economics 
 
This chapter describes which methods behavioral economists use to measure 
cooperativeness and what their advantages and disadvantages are. Behavioral 
economists heavily rely on laboratory experiments. That is remarkable, because 
experiments were not used very often by economists in the past, because they 
tended to rely on mathematical theories and empirical data from the field.  
In an experiment one or more parameters of a specific condition are systematically 
changed and the effects of these changes are measured. The factors which are 
varied are called independent variables and the effect of a change is called 
dependent variable (Hogg & Vaughn, 2008, p. 9). To make sure that only the 
independent variables are modified in one condition, control of as many confounding 
variables as possible is necessary (Hogg & Vaughn, 2008, p. 10). Confounding 
variables are any effects on the dependent variables from any source other than 
independent variables. The control of confounding variables guarantees that only 
independent variables are responsible for the change of the dependent variable 
which can be improved by random allocation of participants to the different 
conditions.  
An experiment can be used, for example, to investigate which effect money has on 
cooperation. The independent variable is the amount of money, which can be 
changed in different conditions. The dependent variable is the level of cooperation 
and confounding variables might be the culture of the country or the relationship of 
the participating people. To avoid any effect of culture in this example, people from 
different cultures should be put randomly into every condition of the experiment. After 
eliminating the effect of all confounding variables it is obvious that any change in 
cooperation in the different conditions is due to changes in the amount of money.  
 
2.4. Advantages and disadvantages of experiments 
 
A big advantage of experiments is that it is possible to draw causal conclusions. A 
laboratory experiment reduces the possible explanations of a certain behavior in the 
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ideal case to one reason. Empirical data collected on the field on the other hand 
allows different explanations for a specific behavior, because it is almost impossible 
to manipulate the environment in a way that only one reason remains, because the 
environment is so complex. 
A second big advantage of an experimental approach is that it is possible to change 
the conditions very easily (Falk & Heckman, 2009). Due to the fact that experimental 
designs are held simple, it is possible to extract the effect of one change of the 
design directly. In the “real” world it is almost impossible to change only one 
condition, because the world’s complexity and nobody knows how different aspects 
interact with each other and which effect a change of one variable might cause. 
A third advantage is the easy replicability of experiments (Falk & Heckman, 2009). By 
using this very controlled environment, which reduces the decision of the person to 
its very core and avoids “noise” of other variables as much as possible, experiments 
can be replicated. This would be impossible in the field, because so many things in 
the real world influence the results, for example the weather, the day of the week or 
any other factor which the scientists do not or cannot take into account. The best way 
to prove any results of any research is by replicating them. 
Another advantage is the cost factor. Using a laboratory saves time and money, 
because there is no necessity to search participants in the needed environment. You 
can create any environment in the lab and fill it with random people or with the group 
necessary for the experiment. All you need are computers and software which are 
the core of every lab. Nowadays computers are cheap and to perform simple 
experiments you do not need expensive software. A second cost factor is the 
payment for the participants, which is common in economics but not in psychology, to 
make sure that the participants have a proper incentive to act according to their true 
preferences. 
A big disadvantage of a laboratory experiment, on the other hand, is that it might be 
difficult to convert the results of the lab to the real environment, because an 
experiment is always an artificially created situation, which will never happen this way 
in the real world. In the real world people do not know exactly how their behavior 
might affect other people and what their effort levels and output are, because these 
variables are not completely observable. It is impossible to avoid this problem, so it is 
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important to keep that in mind and to test theories and hypothesis by using 
experiments and empirical data.  
A second disadvantage could be a selection effect, which means that most samples 
consist of students, especially economics students, and therefore many critics argue 
that these samples are biased and not reflecting the “real” population (Falk & 
Heckman, 2009). Students are easy to find for teaching experimenters and they are 
often more motivated to participate, because they get money or a grade in exchange 
for participation. This critique is justified and it has been tested if non-students would 
act differently in the experiments. There have been several experiments with other 
groups like CEOs and the results were almost the same as in the student design of 
the experiment (Fehr & List, 2004). Another interesting result is that behavior of 
participants with different socio-economic background does not differ significantly in a 
one shot public goods game (Gächter, Herrmann & Thöni, 2004). The reason why 
the results do not differ among different groups might be that the decisions made in 
these experiments are so simple that socio-economic background has no influence.  
Another common point of criticism is that the stakes are too low and therefore 
participants act differently than they would in the real world. When stakes increase, 
behavior becomes more selfish and more like assumed in the standard economic 
theory. Ultimatum games in Indonesia with a stake of the income of three months, 
however, showed that the results did not change significantly even if the stakes were 
very high (Cameron, 1999). The same insignificant difference in results was found in 
Russia, where students were offered up to three times of their monthly income in a 
gift exchange market game (Fehr, Fischbacher & Tougareva, 2002). 
A fourth problem is that participants might have other reasons for their behavior than 
intended by the experimenters. It is quite common that participants understand the 
purpose of the experiment and therefore might act in a way to help the experimenter 
to get the “right” results. This is possible, because designs are often simple and 
straight forward, especially if participants study economics and have learned about 
similar experiments before. This phenomenon is called “demand characteristics”, 
because participants show characteristics which are demanded by the experimenter 
(Hogg & Vaughan, 2008, p. 11). 
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2.5. Games 
 
The most common way to test cooperative behavior in the laboratory is to use 
games. A game is a setup in which two or more persons are asked to act while their 
behavior is observed. 
 
2.5.1. Prisoner´s dilemma 
 
One of the most famous examples of a game and the fact that people can cooperate 
even if it is better to deceive according to self-interest maximization is the prisoner´s 
dilemma (PD). 
The setting of the classical PD is that two players are imprisoned and they are 
accused of a crime. Both players have to decide whether to confess or to stay silent, 
but they cannot communicate with each other. If both stay silent, they get a low 
punishment (1, 1). If both confess, they get a high punishment (5, 5). With only these 
two options it is clear that both prisoners would stay silent. The third possible 
outcome, however, makes the dilemma visible. If one confesses and the other one 
stays silent, the confessor becomes a key witness and is not punished, while the 
silent player gets a very high punishment (0, 10). If they act in pure self-interest, they 
will not cooperate and therefore confess because they would expect the other player 
to confess. The other player expects this behavior and reacts by confessing to avoid 
the worst outcome, where the other prisoner confesses while he stays silent (10.0). In 
the end both are worse off, because they did not cooperate. The outcomes are 
visualised in figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
  Suspect B 
  Confess Not confess 
Suspect A 
Confess 5,5 0,10 
Not confess 10,0 1,1 
Table 1: Outcomes of a prisoners´ dilemma (Wilkinson, 2008, p. 337) 
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In empirical studies approximately fifty percent of the games in one shot situations 
end in cooperation, which is contrary to self-interest theory (Wilkinson, 2008, p. 337). 
This game measures conditional reciprocity, which will be explained in chapter 2.7.1. 
In a sequel PD the players only cooperate if no one defects in earlier rounds of the 
game. As soon as one player stops cooperating, the other will do so as well and 
cooperation ends with the result that reciprocity is conditional (Falk & Fischbacher, 
2006). 
 
2.5.2. Ultimatum game 
 
This game, introduced by Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982), consists of two 
players; one is the proposer and the other one the responder. The proposer gets a 
fixed amount of money from the experimenter and has to decide how much he keeps 
and how much he gives the responder. The responder has two options: He can either 
keep the money the proposer offers and both get their share of the money or he 
rejects the offer and both players get nothing. 
If the assumptions of the standard economic theory that all humans are rational and 
utility maximizing holds, the result should be that the proposer can offer any amount 
above zero, because the responder would be better off and therefore not reject even 
the tiniest amount of money. Empirical data, however, shows that responders reject 
offers below 20% of the available amount (Levitt & List, 2007). Knowing that most 
people would reject a very unfair offer, most proposers offer 25-50% of the money 
they got (Levitt & List, 2007). 
The Ultimatum game measures the responder’s negative reciprocity, which means 
punishing unkind behavior, because the responder has the power to reject the offer 
of the proposer and therefore to punish him for unacceptable offers (Levitt & List, 
2007). For the proposer this game is a measure of fairness, because he can decide 
how to distribute the money (Levitt & List, 2007). 
A big advantage of this game is that it is really simple and therefore easy to explain, 
to implement and to monitor. 
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2.5.3. Dictator game 
 
The dictator game is similar to the ultimatum game, but the difference is that the 
responder cannot reject the offer of the proposer. He has to accept it and cannot 
punish the proposer for an unfair offer. Therefore, this game is a measure of altruism, 
fairness and inequity aversion, because the proposer has no incentive at all to give 
the “responder” any share of the money, because the responder has no possibility to 
punish him and the players do not know each other (Levitt & List, 2007). 
Nevertheless around 60% of the people give money to the responder, but the 
proposers are less generous with an average share of around 20% (Levitt & List, 
2007). Standard economic theory would assume that nobody would give any share of 
the money at all, so 20% is an impressive proof that social preferences exist. 
 
2.5.4. Trust game 
 
In the trust game player A receives an endowment from the experimenter. Player A 
has the opportunity to send some of his money to player B, knowing that B can either 
keep the money or send some or all the money back to player A. The money sent to 
B is multiplied by the experimenter with a factor bigger than 1, which makes both 
players better off, if A sends money to B and B sends some of it back (Berg, Dickhaut 
& McCabe, 1995). 
Assuming that the players act according to the standard economic theory and 
therefore act rationally and utility maximizing, B has no incentive to send A money 
back, because A has no way to punish him for his unkind behavior. A anticipates this 
behavior, because it would be rational and therefore A would not send any money to 
B with the result that A keeps all the money and no transaction happens. Empirical 
data on the other hand shows that A sends on average approximately 50% of his 
endowment to B and B returns around 50% of the money to A (Berg, Dickhaut & 
McCabe, 1995). Again we see that people are showing social preferences and are 
not acting fully rational. 
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This game leads to good results, if you want to measure trust of A and 
trustworthiness of B. A has to trust B if he sends him money and B acts trustworthy if 
he returns money to A (Levitt & List, 2007). Additionally, this game is a good indicator 
for positive reciprocity of B, because he has the opportunity to reward A for his 
behavior (Levitt and List, 2007). Therein lies a problem of the trust game. It possible 
to know, if A acts out of trust or reciprocity. Furthermore A can send money to B 
because of other-regarding preferences unconditional of other people like altruism or 
inequity aversion or out of spitefulness towards the experimenter to let him pay as 
much as possible (Harrison, 2008).  
One way to get rid of these confounds, is to modify game designs according to Cox 
(2004). In his article Cox (2004) uses a so called triadic design to avoid confounds 
and to identify trust and reciprocity behavior. Instead of playing only one trust game, 
he lets the players play three different games in an across subject design. This 
means that players change every round to avoid learning or strategy effects. The first 
game, an investment game, is similar to the trust game described above except that 
both players receive an endorsement. The second game is a dictator game, where 
the first player of the first game chooses the amount the second player gets and the 
third game is a dictator game, where the second player has the choice of how much 
he gives the first player of the first game (Cox, 2004). According to Cox (2004) the 
advantage of this design is that it is possible to find out if the players act out of 
altruism or out of reciprocity and trust, because the trust game shows, if the players 
act out of reciprocity or trust and in the dictator games they show if they act out of 
altruism. Nevertheless this design cannot clarify if the players act out of inequity 
aversion or spitefulness and it is not clear either if the players act out of reciprocity or 
trust. This might be found out, if an ultimatum game is added. A disadvantage of this 
design is that it takes much longer and is therefore more expensive and exhausting 
for the participants. 
 
2.5.5. Gift exchange game 
 
The gift exchange game is an experiment which is constructed like a typical employer 
employee relation with an incomplete contract (Fehr, Kirchsteiger & Riedl, 1993). In 
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this experiment player A offers player B a salary and player B chooses an effort level 
in response (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006).  
Principal agent theory predicts in this case that player B will choose the lowest 
possible effort level, no matter how much salary he gets, because he has no 
incentive to do otherwise, since A cannot control his behavior. A anticipates this 
behavior and therefore offers the lowest possible wage with the result that B indeed 
chooses the lowest possible effort and both act rationally as the model predicts. 
Empirical data and everyday experience, however, show that employers, in our case 
A, pay more than necessary, because they want bigger efforts. Employees, in our 
case B, show more effort than predicted, which leads to a positive wage effort 
relation (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). It can be derived from the data that employers do 
not want employees that accept the lowest possible wage, because in that case they 
expect that these workers will not work hard enough (Fehr & Falk, 1999). Market 
experiment wages are significantly above the minimum wage level and stayed there 
even when minimum wages were abolished again (Falk, Fehr & Zehnder, 2006). 
Similar to the trust game this game is a good measure of trust and trustworthiness 
(Levitt & List, 2007). A, the employer, trusts B, the employee to show more effort if he 
increases his salary. On the other hand, B is considered trustworthy if he indeed 
shows more effort when A offers a higher wage than the minimum. 
 
2.5.6. Public goods game 
 
In a standard public goods game four players are endorsed with the same number of 
tokens. First every player has to decide how many of them he wants to keep and how 
many he wants to put into the pool. After everybody has made their decision, the 
tokens in the pool are multiplied by a specific factor and then equally divided among 
the players. (Chaudhuri, 2011)  
If all the players were acting only out of self-interest, the best strategy would be to 
keep all the money, if everybody else in the game puts his money in the pool. The 
person, who keeps his money, has most in the end, because he gets his share of the 
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pool and his whole endorsement. However, if everybody thinks like that, nobody will 
put any money in the pool and everybody is worse off. 
Experimental results show that participants contribute on average 40% to 60% of 
their endorsement and that contribution declines over time as more players tend to 
free ride (Chaudhuri, 2011). Ways to increase contributions are to allow 
communication, to implement a threshold or to increase the factor the money is 
multiplied by in the pool (Ledyard, 1995, cited in Chaudhuri, 2011). 
 
2.5.7. Possible variations in games 
 
 One-shot vs. iterated interaction games 
One-shot interaction means that a game only lasts one round. In iterated interactions 
the game takes more than one round. The Differences are that it is not possible to 
build reputation to learn the behavior patterns of the other players and that there are 
no learning effects in a one-shot interaction game. 
 Across subject vs. within subject interaction 
In an across subject design the playing parties change every round of a game. This 
design is also called stranger condition. In a within subject design the players stay 
the same for the whole game, which is also called partner condition. The difference is 
that there are no learning effects or strategic thinking in an across subject design. 
Every round of an iterated game in an across subject design is a one shot game with 
all its advantages and disadvantages. 
 Face to face vs. computer interaction 
Another important decision is if games should take place in front of computers or face 
to face. People act less selfish, when they interact face to face, because they can talk 
and actually see their counterparts and their reaction and therefore social norms are 
activated. 
Another way to use computers is to create standardized settings. Rilling et al. (2002) 
for example let the participants play prisoner´s dilemmas on a computer. Under one 
17 
 
condition they told the players that they would play against a computer and in the 
second condition they told them that they would play against humans, whereas in 
fact they always played against a computer. That way you can standardize the 
answers of the opponent of the participant, which reduces complexity and possible 
problems due to uncommon or irrational choices. Results showed that players acted 
significantly less cooperative, when they were told that they play against a computer 
(Rilling et al., 2002; Suzuki et al., 2011). 
 Earned vs. endorsed money 
It is standard in economic experiments to give the participants money for their effort. 
Normally they get a fixed amount of money to play with in the experiment and 
according to their performance in the game they get paid out. So it is possible that 
players do not value the money they get before the experiment, because they got it 
without effort. 
To test whether there is a difference if the players have to earn the money to play 
with in the experiments or if they get it for free from the experimenter, Oxoby and 
Spraggon (2008) modified a dictator game by adding the so called receiver earnings 
treatment, in which the proposer gets his capital to allocate in the game depending 
on the performance of the responder in an exam. The more questions the responder 
answers correctly the more money the proposer starts the game with. He afterwards 
has to decide, how much of the money he keeps and how much he gives the 
responder, who actually earned the money. This treatment should create a moral 
conflict, because the proposer has the power to keep all the money, but the 
responder earned it and so it would be unfair to do so.  
 
Table 2: Percentage offers by treatment and wealth level (Oxoby & Spraggon, 2008, p. 706) 
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The results in table 2 show that the offers were higher in the receiver earnings 
treatment than in the standard dictator treatment and increased the better the 
responders were at the exam (Oxoby & Spraggon, 2008). This indicates that it makes 
a difference if the money was earned or simply endorsed. 
 Height of stakes 
Normally the person gets a show up fee and/or he can earn money according to the 
decisions he makes during the experiment. To keep the costs low the stakes are 
normally relatively low, usually up to 15 €. A point of criticism therefore might be that 
the stakes are too low to make people care. It would be very expensive to increase 
the stakes and therefore Cameron (1999) tested, if the height of the stakes changes 
the results of ultimatum games. To keep the costs low, they conducted the 
experiment in Indonesia, where they let people play for stakes up to three months of 
their income (Cameron, 1999). The results in figure 1 show that even very high 
stakes could not crowd out cooperation, especially the behavior of the proposer did 
not change with the height of stakes (Cameron, 1999). 
 
Figure 1: Left: Proposer and responder behavior at stakes of 5000 and 40000 rupees (Cameron, 1999, p. 52); Right: 
Proposer and responder behavior at stakes of 5000 and 200000 rupees (Cameron, 1999, p. 53) 
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Therefore the relative height of the stake compared to the income of the participants 
showed no impact on the behavior in ultimatum games. Cooperation is not 
decreasing in dependency on the height of the stake. 
Another experiment investigated the influence of the absolute height of the stake on 
the cooperation rate. Absolute here means the height of the number. Furlong and 
Opfer (2009) tested in prisoner´s dilemma games if cooperation rates change if the 
numeric values of the stakes are higher, even if the money value stays the same. 
The higher the reward for cooperation the higher is the rate of cooperation in this kind 
of game, because it becomes more preferable than defection. They compared 
games, where they varied for example the stakes for cooperation between 3$ and 
300¢ and all other outcomes in the same way between dollars and pennies, so that 
the money value was the same, but the numeric values were different (Furlong & 
Opfer, 2009). Results showed a significant difference in cooperation rates. Players 
cooperated more, when the stakes were posted in pennies, which is remarkable, 
because the money values of the stakes were the same in the dollar and penny 
conditions (Furlong & Opfer, 2009). This proves that the height of the number has an 
influence on the cooperation rate, because the higher the number the more it looks 
like, even if this is not the case.  
 
2.6.  “Typical” results in an experiment of cooperative behavior 
 
A good experiment to measure cooperation is the public goods game. To maximize 
the outcome of all players, all players should invest their complete stake. If they 
cooperate, they earn the highest possible amount of money. In these experiments 
people cooperate in the first rounds and put some of their money in the pool, but the 
contribution rate decreases over time.  
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Figure 2: Average contributions over time in the stranger treatment (Fehr & Gächter, 2000, p. 986) 
 
The white dots of figure 2 show a result typical of basic cooperation experiments: The 
cooperation level starts higher than expected by standard economic theory and 
declines over time. This figure also shows that the public goods game is a very 
variable game. There are many factors that can be implemented like a “punishment” 
and “stranger” condition in this case which can be seen for the graph with black dots. 
This flexibility makes it possible to test many hypotheses concerning cooperation just 
by modifying the conditions of the game, which would be very difficult and time and 
cost intensive in the field. 
 
2.7. Reasons for cooperation 
 
2.7.1. Reciprocity 
 
Reciprocity means that people respond to other peoples´ behavior with the same 
behavior (Fehr & Gächter, 2000), even if no material gains are expected (Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2002). This behavior seems clear, when we interact with friends and 
relatives, but it even occurs, when complete strangers meet each other (Nowak & 
Sigmund, 1998).  
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Reciprocity can be categorized in different ways. Positive reciprocity means that 
people react kindly to kind actions towards them and negative reciprocity means that 
people react negatively to negative actions (Fehr & Gächter, 2000). Positive 
reciprocity is the rewarding aspect of reciprocity and negative reciprocity is the 
punishing aspect.  
Applied to cooperative behavior, positive reciprocity means that people are willing to 
cooperate if others act cooperatively. This might be an explanation why humans 
cooperate in gift exchange games, although it would be rational not to cooperate. 
One kind of reciprocity driven cooperation is called conditional cooperation, which 
means that one person cooperates if the other person also does so (Fischbacher, 
Gächter & Fehr, 2001). This is known as the ”tit for tat“ strategy (Axelrod & Hamilton, 
1981). In the first round players usually cooperate to show the other player that they 
are willing to do so.  
This attitude towards cooperation might be a signal that a person is very reciprocal. 
Even in situations, where incentives not to cooperate are high, these people remain 
reciprocal and contribute the same amount of money (Fischbacher, Gächter & Fehr, 
2001). This form of reciprocity is also called direct reciprocity. 
Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001) found out that in a one-shot public goods 
game 50% of the people were conditional co-operators, who were willing to 
contribute more the more others contribute. The figure below also shows that 30% 
are free-riders and contribute nothing no matter how much the other players 
contribute. The third group of players show “hump-shaped” behavior. They cooperate 
on the low contribution levels and free-ride as soon as contribution levels rise above 
a specific level. 
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Figure 3: Average of the own contribution compared with average contribution of other members (diagonal=perfect 
conditional) (Fischbacher, Gächter & Fehr, 2001, p. 400) 
 
This coexistence of co-operators and free-riders has the effect that small changes in 
the setting of the game can change the result and that not all members of the group 
have to be cooperative in nature to provide the overall result of cooperation (Gintis et 
al., 2003).  
Indirect reciprocity might also be an important reason for cooperation. Indirect 
reciprocity means that a third person knows how a player behaved in a specific game 
or situation and reacts according to it (Engelmann & Fischbacher, 2009). This 
concept is related to reputation building. If somebody knows the history of a person, 
he also knows how he is likely to react in the future and this reputation might change 
decision behavior. To make a cooperative system based on indirect reciprocity work, 
two conditions must be met. First, it is necessary that good reputation will be 
rewarded and second, people have to be willing to invest into their reputation 
(Engelmann & Fischbacher, 2009). 
So there are different forms of reciprocity like direct or indirect and positive or 
negative reciprocity, which are all important for cooperative behavior. Direct 
reciprocity is one explanation why two people cooperate in a repeated interaction. If 
there is no repeated interaction cooperation can still happen due to indirect 
reciprocity, which is similar to reputation. But even in one-shot public goods 
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experiments approximately 50% of the participants are cooperative, on the condition 
that the other participants are cooperative. They are so-called conditional co-
operators. Kind behavior in answer to kind behavior of others is called positive 
reciprocity. Negative reciprocity, on the other hand, describes the punishing aspect of 
reciprocity. Interestingly enough, people tend to punish even if it is costly for them 
(Fehr & Gächter, 2000). 
 
2.7.2. Incentives 
 
Punishments and rewards are a way to increase cooperation. Punishing selfish 
behavior and rewarding cooperative behavior looks like a straight forward and 
transparent way to promote cooperation. Fehr and Gächter (2000) added a 
punishment condition to a public goods game. The first stage of that game consisted 
of a standard public goods game with standard results (cooperation above standard 
economic prediction but decreasing over time). In the second stage it was possible to 
punish other players by reducing their income. This was done by buying punishment 
points and assigning them to the other player. After this modification cooperation 
rates increased and stayed high (Figure 2), although those punishment points were 
costly and therefore reduced the income of the punisher as well. This result is 
contrary to standard economic theory, which predicts that no punishment would 
happen, because it would also reduce the income of the punisher.  
A disadvantage of punishment is that it reduces the efficiency of the outcome, 
because income gets lost by punishing. A way to avoid this is to replace punishment 
with redistribution. This means that punishment does not only reduce the income of 
the free-rider but it also increases the income of the co-operator, rewarding him. 
Sausgruber and Tyran (2007) showed experimentally that this is a possible 
mechanism to induce cooperation with a “costless” sanction (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Average contributions over time in basic (white dots) and redistribution condition (black triangles) (Sausgruber 
& Tyran, 2007, p. 336) 
 
2.7.3. Inequity aversion 
 
An individual is inequity averse if he dislikes outcomes that are perceived as 
inequitable (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999, p. 820). This means that every person has a 
different threshold of perceived inequity aversion. It depends on the reference 
outcome which he uses for the specific situation so the relative outcome matters 
(Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000).  
This attitude can explain why some people give money in the dictator game (Fehr & 
Schmidt, 2006). They want to reduce inequality and raise the other player to their 
own level. It also can explain why people punish selfish behavior in the ultimatum 
game by rejecting too low offers and it helps to understand why this level of rejection 
is different for each person. Everyone has a different point of reference outcome 
which he defines as unequal. 
 
2.8. Differences in culture 
 
Cooperative behavior seems to differ across cultures. Herrmann, Thöni and Gächter 
(2008) conducted public goods games in 16 different regions of the world and the 
results, visualized in figure 5, show that there are differences between different 
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cultures. The results of the left figure are not as surprising as those of the right one. 
In the left part of figure 5 public goods game were played without the possibility to 
punish antisocial behavior. Tendencies are the same across all cultures. Contribution 
decreases over time. The right part reflects the results of public goods games, 
conducted with the possibility to punish antisocial behavior. The results show that 
there is cross-societal variation. In some pools high contribution was as much 
punished as low contribution, whereas in others only low contributors were 
sanctioned and in some the extent of antisocial punishment even removed the effect 
of punishment to enhance cooperation (Herrmann, Gächter & Thöni, 2008). One 
possible explanation is that some punish those who deviate from the norm, 
regardless in which direction, to bring them back in line (Herrmann, Gächter & Thöni, 
2008). The reason is that they are suspicious of others who are too generous and 
therefore do not act according to the norm (Herrmann, Gächter & Thöni, 2008). 
 
Figure 5: Left: Differences in cooperation across cultures without punishment (Herrmann, Thöni & Gächter, 2008, p. 
1365); Right: Differences in cooperation across cultures with punishment (Herrmann, Thöni & Gächter, 2008, p. 1364) 
 
2.9. Ways to increase cooperation in games 
 
After explaining some reasons for cooperation, it is possible to use this knowledge to 
show how to increase cooperation. 
Using reciprocity to increase cooperation might be accomplished by using partner 
conditions in experiments and showing the decision history of the participants to build 
up reputation. 
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It can be assumed that 50% of the people are conditional co-operators and 
cooperative equilibria are fragile because of free riders and “humped-shaped” 
behaving people. Therefore it is important to choose the right members for the 
games, like in real organisations, where some “rotten apples” might spoil the whole 
group. 
Another possible approach to increase cooperation in games is to allow 
communication between the players. Isaak and Walker (1988) showed in a modified 
trust game that communication increases the contribution rate. The possibility to 
communicate with the other players might increase the willingness to cooperate, 
because that way they might express their feelings and their possible disapproval 
with words instead of punishment. Houser and Xiao (2005) modified an Ultimatum 
game by giving the responder the possibility to tell the proposer his feelings after 
accepting or rejecting the offer. The results in figure 6 show that the possibility to 
express emotions reduced the rejection rate significantly when only 20% of the 
money was offered (Houser & Xiao, 2005). So many offers are rejected to show 
disapproval and if other ways are offered to express oneself, people prefer cost-
efficient ways. 
 
 
Figure 6: Rejection rates of several offers dependent on emotion expression(Houser & Xiao, 2005, p. 7400) 
 
A proven way to increase cooperation is to add a possibility to sanction selfish 
behavior (Fehr & Gächter, 2002). Sanctions do not have to be monetary. Sausgruber 
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and Tyran (2007) improved the rate of cooperation by making redistribution possible. 
The big advantage of this approach is that redistribution is more efficient than a costly 
punishment mechanism. The costs of punishment are lost for all players and reduce 
the pot, whereas distribution only shifts money from one player to the other. . The 
cultural background has to be taken into account, when introducing a punishment 
opportunity, because not in all cultures punishment leads to higher cooperation 
(Herrmann, Thöni & Gächter, 2008). 
Zelmer (2003) identified in a Meta-study of 27 lab experiments that three variables 
were highly significantly responsible for an increase in cooperation in public goods 
games: “Marginal per capita return”, “Communication allowed” and “Constant groups 
for session”. This means that the highest increase in cooperation occurs in a setting, 
in which the pool is multiplied by a high factor, communication is allowed and the 
players stay the same for the whole experiment. 
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3. Cooperative behavior in the light of neuroeconomics 
 
3.1 Definition of Neuroeconomics 
 
It is very difficult to find a single definition for neuroeconomics that fits for all research 
in this field. It is obvious that neuroeconomics combines neuroscience and 
economics, but in which way and to which purpose, is still not finally determined yet. 
Neuroscience might help to answer fundamental questions of economics, because its 
aim is to understand how the brain works on a mechanical level, namely on the level 
of neurons and synapses. By knowing how the brain functions neuroscience wants to 
find out how thoughts and choices work. So neuroscience chooses an inductive 
approach to generate knowledge. Although both sciences share the goal to 
understand human behavior, research strategies have been very different. As already 
mentioned above, economics uses mainly mathematics and nowadays experiments 
whereas neuroscience uses experimentally obtained data from the brain, like brain 
images or animal experiments. Neuroeconomics tries to combine these two 
approaches.  
Fumagalli (2010) shows this diversity of definitions by giving different definitions from 
different groups of researchers that show different foci and goals. Some experts do 
not see neuroeconomics as a new field but rather as an extension or application of 
economics or a new method for economic research, whereas others consider it a 
new interdisciplinary discipline (Fumagalli, 2010).  
Neuroeconomists believe that this combination of economics and neuroscience is 
one step towards a unification of economics and psychology (Fehr & Camerer, 2007). 
Both disciplines focus on human behavior, but separated at the beginning of the 20th 
century. Neuroscience might be able to bring them together again, because it offers a 
common ground of methodology, data, definitions and theories on the neural level. It 
would be possible for both disciplines to communicate in a language both fields 
understand. 
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3.2 Fields of Neuroeconomics 
 
Ross (2008) distinguishes two fields of neuroeconomics: “Behavioral economics in a 
scanner” (BES) and “Neurocellular economics” (NE).  
“Behavioral economics in a scanner” is behavioral economics using methods of 
neuroscience. A main characteristic of BES is that it is assumed that specific 
behavior leads to an increased activation in particular parts of the brain (Vromen, 
2011). Furthermore, BES is used to generate more data to confirm questions from 
behavioral economics. BES, for example, registers brain activity of people in an 
ultimatum game inside an MRI scanner. This is one reason, why neuroeconomics 
have often been criticised. It is argued that in the end it is just behavioral economics 
with fancy machinery, a marketing gag of behavioral economics but nothing new.  
“Neurocellular economics” or “economics of neural activity” uses modelling 
techniques and theories of economics to make models of brain cell activity or brain 
organisation. It is possible to use economic theory for explanations how the brain 
works, because brains and markets have in common that they are both parallel 
processors (Ross, 2008). According to Ross (2008) they both learn and optimize the 
same way. Thinking in an economic way helps for example to understand the model 
of the midbrain/striatal dopamine circuit. This circuit is responsible for rewarding and 
integrates attentional cueing, value estimation and motor response preparation 
(Ross, 2008). This integration is similar to those of economic models of utility, but 
instead of money, dopamine signals are the currency of the brain and therefore 
maximized (Harrison & Ross, 2010). 
Although both fields are called neuroeconomics there are differences between them. 
BES uses neuroscientific knowledge to reject standard economic theory, whereas NE 
uses standard economic theory to study neural behavior and does not want to reject 
it but rather enrich it (Harrison & Ross, 2010). Across these differences there is 
common ground that it is necessary to develop new economic models and theories, 
because the predictive power of standard economic theory is poor (Vromen, 2011). 
Additionally, both fields believe that neuroscience can help and enrich economics 
especially as far as choice theory is concerned (Vromen, 2011). 
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Most of the criticism on neuroeconomics is not headed towards NE but towards BES, 
but this differentiation has been widely ignored by critics so far. This thesis will focus 
on BES, because most of the research about cooperative behavior was done in that 
field. 
 
3.3 Basic neuroanatomy 
 
This chapter offers a very brief introduction to neuroanatomy. The main areas of the 
brain will be presented and allocated to specific areas of the brain. Furthermore it will 
be explained, what neural activity is and how it works. Finally some important brain 
regions will be explained more closely, because they are of interest in 
neuroeconomics of cooperative behavior, like the reward circuit and the limbic 
system. 
 
3.3.1 Orientation in the brain 
 
Knowing directions is crucial for orientation. Figure 7 introduces the specific terms 
that are used in anatomy when talking about directions in the brain. If you take the 
centre of the brain as a reference point, the front side is called anterior. Posterior is 
the term that refers to the lower side of the brain. The upside area of the brain is 
called dorsal. Ventral is the opposite direction of dorsal. The midline divides the brain 
in two parts. Medial is used to describe any area closer to the midline whereas lateral 
refers to any area further away from it. (Pinel, 2007, p. 63) 
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Figure 7: Anatomical directions in a human (Pinel, 2009, p. 63) 
 
3.3.2 A map of the brain 
 
The human brain has three major parts: The brain stem, which is the connection 
between the brain and the spinal cord and the oldest part of the brain, the 
Cerebellum, a rippled part under the cerebrum and the cerebrum, the largest and 
youngest part of the brain (Bear et al., 2007, p. 209). The cerebrum is subdivided into 
four parts. The frontal lobe lies at the front of the brain, the parietal lobe at the vertex, 
the temporal lobe closest to the stem and the occipital lobe at the back of the brain. 
The left and the right half of the cerebrum are anatomically the same but have 
different functions. 
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Figure 8: Areas of the human brain (Bear et al., 2007, p. 209) 
 
Another way to divide the cerebrum is by 
splitting it up into zones. The 
cytoarchitectural map by Korbinian 
Brodmann numerates 46 zones according to 
their cytoarchitecture (Bear et al., 2007, p. 
198).  
 
 
3.3.3 Neural activity 
The body uses current to transmit information within the body. Without any action the 
current inside the neuron is about -65 mV. As soon as a signal above a certain 
threshold reaches the neuron, the neuron depolarizes. This means that by changing 
its voltage, it sends a signal to the next neuron to which it is connected via synapses. 
Chemical synapses release neurotransmitters which bind to receptors of the next 
Figure 9: Brodmann areas in the human brain (Bear et 
al., 2007, p. 198) 
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neuron and lead to an action potential in the next neuron, which releases 
neurotransmitters and so on. Electrical synapses, on the other hand, allow direct 
transfer of current from one neuron to the other. 
After depolarization the neuron has a refractory period. In this phase the neuron 
cannot be stimulated and returns to its negatively charged state to make new 
depolarisation possible again. 
 
3.3.4 The pleasure/reward centre 
 
The pleasure centre of the 
brain rewards certain 
behavior to reinforce it. 
This is one reason why 
drugs work. Pleasure is 
created by the release of 
the neurotransmitter 
dopamine along the 
nigrostriatal pathway 
(green in figure 10) and 
the mesocorticolimbic 
pathway (red in figure 
10). So the most 
important areas for pleasure and reward in the brain are the prefrontal cortex, the 
limbic system, the amygdala, the striatum, the anterior cingular cortex and the 
nucleus accumbens (Pinel, 2009, p. 392).  
 
  
Figure 10: The mesotelencephalic dopamine system in the human brain (Pinel, 
2009, p. 392) 
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3.3.5 The limbic system 
 
The limbic system is responsible for the experience and expression of emotion (Pinel, 
2009, p. 71). The main structures of the limbic system are the amygdala, the 
hippocampus, the cingular cortex, the fornix, the septum and the mammillary body 
(figure 11). 
 
Figure 11: The major structures of the limbic system (Pinel, 2009, p. 71) 
 
3.4 Methods of neuroeconomics 
 
3.4.1 Neuroeconomic research in practice 
 
Most neuroeconomic studies consist of two parts, the economic and the 
neuroscientific part. The underlying economics of neuroeconomic experiments are 
the same as mentioned in chapter 2 and games (ultimatum, trust, dictator,…) are 
widely used. Games are ideal for this kind of research, because test persons must 
not move at all in an MRI scanner. During an ultimatum game, for example, it is 
35 
 
possible to lie completely still and nevertheless make decisions. The neuroscientific 
part of the experiments is to measure what the brain does during the experimental 
task.  
The most common ways to make the brain´s answers visible are neuroimaging 
techniques and lesions. Each of these methods has its advantages which will be 
shown in the following chapter. Also the application of hormones like oxytocin as a 
neuroeconomic method will be discussed, as it is an uncommon but interesting path 
for the topic of cooperation.  
 
3.4.2 Neuroimaging techniques 
 
There are several imaging techniques which are used in neuroeconomic research. 
The most common are fMRI, PET and EEG.  
 fMRI – functional magnetic resonance imaging 
Like the MRI technology fMRI uses electromagnetic waves to measure activity in 
specific brain regions. The difference is that fMRI uses the so-called BOLD signal 
(Wager et al., 2009, p. 154). “BOLD” stands for “Blood Oxygen Level Dependent” and 
means that the differences in blood oxygen levels in different brain regions are 
visualized. fMRI can measure these differences, because oxygen saturated blood 
has different magnetic attributes than blood with an increased CO2 level. These 
differences are an indicator for altered brain activity, because the brain needs oxygen 
to run and therefore high oxygen levels mean high activity. So fMRI is an indirect 
measure for brain activity.  
fMRI has several advantages (Wager et al., 2009, p. 155): 
- fMRI has been used since the 1970s for medical purposes, so there are 
facilities available, which can be used for neuroeconomic research. 
- fMRI has a high spatial resolution, which means that this method can visualize 
very accurately where brain activity happens. (Other methods are better in 
visualizing when brain activity happens and how it changes over time like the 
EEG, which are therefore called methods with high temporal resolution.) To 
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overcome this disadvantage it is possible to combine EEG with fMRI to 
increase temporal resolution. 
- fMRI technique does not need any injection of radioactive markers, because 
only the blood oxygen level is determined. Therefore multiple scans are 
considered safe for the test person. 
 
 PET – positron emission tomography 
PET is a powerful tool to measure the overall activity of the brain (Wager et al., 2009, 
p. 157). In principle PET exploits the fact that the brain needs glucose to operate. As 
soon as neural activity increases, the activated neurons of the brain demand glucose 
to get the energy needed. Therefore neuroscientists inject radioactive-labelled 
glucose, usually 18F-fluorodeoxyglucose, as a tracer into the carotid. The body 
transports it into the brain, because it cannot differentiate between the “normal” and 
the modified glucose (Pinel, 2007, p. 134). Inside the brain the glucose derivative 
cannot be metabolised and remains at places of high neuronal activity, where it 
decays and emits positrons (Wager et al., 2009, p. 156). These positrons collide with 
neighbouring electrons, which annihilates both particles, and emit two photons in 
opposite directions which are detected by photoreceptive sensors around the test 
person´s head. This information is sent to a computer, where it is interpreted and 
presented as a three dimensional image of the brain. Therefore it is possible to locate 
the exact position of the annihilation of the positron and the electron (but not the 
distribution of the tracer), which means that PET is an indirect measure of brain 
activity (Wager et al., 2009, p. 156). 
Several advantages of PET (Wager et al., 2009, p. 154): 
- PET shows the activity of the brain better than fMRI. 
- Due to the fact that PET uses a radioactive tracer, it does not suffer from 
magnetic artefacts like fMRI. 
- The tracer makes it easier to measure the blood flow and the areas of activity 
in the brain. 
 
 EEG 
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EEG measures the electric activity of the brain, which is the sum of action potentials, 
postsynaptic potentials and electric signals of skin, muscles, blood and the eyes 
(Pinel, 2007, p. 137). If all these activities are measured, however, it is not possible to 
pinpoint down a single source, which makes causal explanations very difficult.  
Thus, EEG is mainly used to identify different levels of consciousness (for example 
sleep), which correlate with certain EEG – wave frequencies (Pinel, 2007, p. 137).  
 
Advantages of EEG: 
- No injection of radioactive tracer necessary 
- Cheap compared to fMRI or PET 
- High temporal resolution (but low spatial resolution, but solvable via 
combination with fMRI)  
 
 Interpreting the results of neuroimaging techniques 
It is very important to know that the results of neuroimaging techniques are presented 
in statistical probabilities or correlations. This means that the colourful regions of the 
brain in the pictures are nothing more than statistical probabilities of occurrence. fMRI 
pictures, for example, show t values of occurrences of activities. In the marked 
regions activity is significantly higher than in other regions. Given the fact that 
thousands of fMRI studies have been done yet, it is very likely that some effects are 
just artefacts or coincident. 
 
3.4.3 Lesions 
 
First neuroscientific research “happened”, when people changed their behavior due 
to injuries of the brain caused by accidents, attacks or aging. People with Parkinson 
disease for example tend to be more honest than the normal population due to 
changes in the brain (Nobuhito et al., 2009). These changes are caused by specific 
lesions of the brain due to the disease. 
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Lesions can be differentiated into permanent or temporal lesions. In experiments, 
permanent lesions are inflicted by knife cuts, radio-frequency current or removing of 
brain mass (Pinel, 2007, p. 143).  
 Cryogenic blockade 
Temporal lesions are made by cryogenic blockade, TMS (transcranial magnetic 
stimulation) or DCS (direct current stimulation). Cryogenic blockade means that the 
area of interest of the brain is cooled down so that neural activity stops but no 
damages occur (Pinel, 2007, p. 143).  
 TMS (transcranial magnetic stimulation) 
TMS uses a magnetic field to change neural activity in a certain brain area. It is still 
unclear how TMS exactly works, but applied frequencies below 1 Hz decreases and 
above 1 Hz increases neural activity (Weber, 2011, p. 52; Sandrini, Umilta & 
Rusconi, 2011). A disadvantage of this method is that its application is limited to 
areas not deeper than 2-3 cm, because the magnetic field is losing strength rapidly 
on its way through the brain (Sandrini, Umilta & Rusconi, 2011).  
 DCS (direct current stimulation) 
DCS uses a constant stream of current instead of a magnetic field to reduce brain 
activity (Weber, 2011, p. 53). This stream of current changes the probability that 
incoming neural signals lead to postsynaptic firing (Wagner et al., 2007). An 
advantage of DCS in contrast to TMS is that test subjects do not feel the current and 
therefore it is easier to distract them (Weber, 2011, p. 53).  
A big advantage of the use of lesions is that, if behavior changes after a lesion, you 
know exactly which region of the brain is responsible for the change. This means that 
it is possible to deduce a causal relation between a change in behavior and the 
destruction/inhibition of a certain brain area (Umilta, 2011). Of course, it is illegal to 
set permanent lesions in humans for scientific purposes only. Therefore stroke or 
tumor patients qualify as subjects for scientific research on lesions. Temporal lesions 
might be a solution, but these methods still bear a risk, because the effects of DCS, 
TMS or cryogenic blockade are not clearly understood yet (Pinel, 2007, p. 136). 
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3.5. Chances of Neuroeconomics 
 
Neuroeconomics is a young discipline with a lot of potential. Although the contribution 
to the field of economics is small yet (McCabe, 2008), there are several ways in 
which neuroeconomics can be useful for economics.  
Brain imaging or studies of people with brain damages in specific brain regions are 
additional sources of data, which can be used to confirm economic hypotheses and 
theories (Spiegler, 2008). Increased demand will improve the methods and reduce 
costs of these still expensive machines. So not only economics benefits from 
neuroeconomics but also medicine and other disciplines that use these methods do. 
Maybe it will be standard one day to measure brain data to get published in 
economics. 
Knowing the “construction plan” of the brain can be useful to answer economic 
questions and to understand why people act the way they do. Neuroeconomic results 
can be added to economic theories and that way improve predictions of economic 
models. Today this map of the brain is still incomplete and so we do not understand 
exactly how the brain works.  
Padoa-Schioppa (2008) argues that neuroeconomics can contribute to economics 
also via psychology.  
“Neural data can and do lead to better psychological theories, and psychological 
insights can and do lead to better economic theories.” (Padoa-Schioppa, 2008, p. 
449) 
Although the three disciplines of neuroscience, psychology and economics work on 
different levels of cognition, all of them are interested in human behavior. Economics 
tries to address human behavior globally with one set of formulas (Glimcher & 
Rustichini, 2004). Psychology works one level below on the individual level and 
neuroscience works on the cellular level. They might benefit from each other, if they 
are unable to answer questions by themselves.  
Unfortunately there are still economists who think that economics does not need 
neuroscience or psychology like Gul and Pesendorfer (2005). One chance of 
40 
 
neuroeconomics might be a step towards the unification of economics, psychology 
and neuroscience into one discipline that studies human behavior (Glimcher & 
Rustichini, 2004). Mathematical (economics), mechanistic (neuroscience) and 
behavioral (psychology) measures and constructs could be brought together in the 
future for the benefit of all (Fehr & Camerer, 2007). Economics and psychology could 
offer the theoretic framework and the object of analysis whereas neuroscience could 
contribute the methods and the language.  
Contributions of neuroeconomics are still small, but it is an area with a lot of potential 
for the future. However, there is plenty of skepticism about the value of 
neuroeconomics. Whereas this chapter dealt with possible ways in which 
neuroeconomics can contribute to economic theory, the next chapter will take a 
closer look at these concerns. 
 
3.6. Critical thoughts on neuroeconomics 
 
3.6.1. Justification issues 
 
There is intense discussion about whether economics can benefit from 
neuroeconomic research at all. Critics argue that neuroeconomics does not answer 
any relevant economic questions the way it is used today. It is just an additional 
source of data for questions of behavioral economics (Ortmann, 2008; Rustichini, 
2005). Putting people into a scanner is not enough to justify a new field of 
economics. Additionally, neuroeconomic research is flawed in many ways as will be 
explained in this chapter. 
According to Gul and Pesendorfer (2005) neuroeconomics makes two claims: The 
first says that psychological and physiological evidence are relevant for economics 
Gul and Pesendorfer (2005) respond that this is not the case. They argue that 
neuroeconomics cannot falsify any standard economic model, because economics 
“address different questions, utilize different abstractions, and address different types 
of empirical data” (Gul & Pesendorfer, 2005, p.1). Neuroeconomics or neuroscience 
in general wants to know more about the functioning of the brain whereas economics 
41 
 
cares about individual choices. These different fields of interest lead to different data. 
Neuroeconomic data has therefore no value for economics, because the two 
disciplines have a different focus of interest. Different scientific traditions of 
neuroscience and economics lead to different meanings and abstractions of 
constructs like risk aversion according to Gul and Pesendorfer (2005), which 
therefore cannot be compared. They point out, however, that this does not mean that 
one definition is better than the other, they are simply different. 
The second claim of neuroeconomics says that economic welfare analysis should 
focus on true utility instead of choice utility (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2005). The concept 
of true utility assumes that a choice is not the expression of what people really want, 
but rather of what they think they want. This assumption makes it clear, why 
neuroeconomics is so often criticized. Neuroeconomics rejects one of the basic 
assumptions of economics, namely that choice is the expression of people´s true will. 
If this is not the case, economic theory has a legitimation problem. In 
neuroeconomics choices are strongly influenced by the environment (for example 
framing) or unconscious factors like priming1. Considering these two different 
concepts of choice, Gul and Pesendorfer (2005) conclude once again that 
neuroeconomics cannot be used in the context of economics. 
Any factor that might influence a person’s choice is seen as an information problem 
by Gul and Pesendorfer (2005): According to them, wrong choices are only due to a 
lack of information. As soon as people find out that they are influenced, they will 
counteract and thus choose what they really want.  
Gul and Pesendorfer´s approach is a very fundamentalistic one according to 
Camerer (2008), because it isolates economics by denying any importance of non-
choice data. Gul and Pesendorfer (2005) reduce all inconsistencies of behavior to a 
lack of information, which can be solved by telling people that they are wrong and by 
making them learn. Even Camerer (2008) agrees that it might be possible to see 
these anomalies as information problems, but using constructs or theories of other 
fields might be more elegant and simple than constructing for every psychological 
phenomenon an information problem. The central assumption of the information 
problem argument is that all behavior is conscious choice, which can be changed, if 
                                                          
1
 A prime is the presentation of a stimulus that affects the recognition of the following stimulus (Neely, 2003, 
cited in Sternberg, 2009). 
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you tell the choosing person that he might be in danger of acting irrational and let him 
learn. This is a noble attitude towards human learning behavior but Friedman (1998) 
showed in the “Monty-Hall Problem”2 that people make irrational decisions even if 
they were told so and therefore had the opportunity to learn. 
Another central assumption of neuroeconomics is that it is possible to track down the 
exact region of the brain that is responsible for a decision. According to Umilta (2011) 
this might be seen as a modern form of phrenology3, where every region of the brain 
is responsible for one function, because this is not the case.  
According to Umilta (2011) it is a common misconception that the brain can be 
separated into independent structures that are responsible for specific neural 
activities and that every thought or action can be traced back to a specific mental 
process. Assuming this modularity of the brain and the mind should make it possible 
to track down specific areas of the brain that are responsible for specific actions of 
the mind in an almost one-to-one fashion. (Umilta, 2011) This approach is neither 
new nor the only approach towards the organisation of the brain. Besides the former 
approach of phrenology exists a holistic approach towards the organisation of the 
brain. This means according to Umilta (2011) that there are no specific brain areas 
that are solely responsible for thoughts or feelings.  
Another problem related to the topic is called “reverse inference fallacy” (Umilta, 
2011; Poldrack, 2006; Harrison & Ross, 2010). Reverse inference in neuroeconomics 
means concluding from the activation of region A to a cognitive process B (Poldrack, 
2006). Most brain regions, however, have more than one function and therefore may 
light up during scans due to many reasons (Cabesza & Nyberg, 2000). This means 
that neural activity does not necessarily have to be connected to the function tested 
                                                          
2 There are three doors to choose from. There is a prize behind one door. The subject has to choose 
one door. Afterwards the experimenter opens one of the two doors not chosen. He opens one, which 
does not contain a prize. Two doors are left closed. The subject can switch to the other closed door 
or remain at his previously chosen door. Afterwards his chosen door is opened and he gets a prize if 
he has chosen the right one. The optimal strategy is to switch after the first round. 
3 Phrenology is a „science“ of the 19th century, which tried to correlate the structure of the head 
with different behavioral traits like destructiveness, imitation or hope, because it was believed that 
the form of the skull reflects the form of the brain and the form of the brain is related to personality 
traits. (Bear et al., 2007, p. 10) 
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in the experiment. Therefore we cannot extract the effect of the experiment from the 
effect measured (Poldrack, 2006) and as a consequence it is very difficult to draw 
causal conclusions from brain images (Harrison & Ross, 2010).  
Another problem of imaging techniques is the so called “ground noise” (Ortmann, 
2008). It is not possible to live without basic brain activities and these signals “pollute” 
brain images. Even controlling for these activities does not help, since most regions 
have more than one function. Another source of noise is the fact that lying in a 
scanner or having electrodes fixed on one´s head is an uncommon experience and 
might therefore influence the results as well.  
 
3.6.2 Methodological issues 
 
Methodological issues are a big problem of neuroeconomic research. To generalize 
results it is necessary to use a representative sample. Nowadays, most studies prefer 
healthy and young people, because experiments can be exhausting or even painful, 
if you get contrast substances injected.  
Sample size is a second problem. Scanner time is very expensive and therefore the 
samples are often reduced to a critical size which can reduce the power of the study 
and therefore make interpretations more difficult (Harrison, 2008).  
False positive results are another problem in neuroeconomic studies, if the 
significance levels are not corrected when dealing with multiple comparisons 
(Bennett et al., 2009). Corrections are necessary, because the brain is divided into 
about 130.000 voxels (three dimensional units for MRI imaging) and during one MRI 
many thousands of images are made of each of them. This raises the probability of 
false positive results. Although it is common to decrease the level of significance to 
p<0,001 per voxel and only interpret results if the cluster size is at least 8 voxels, 
Bennett et al. (2009) showed that this might not be enough. They argue that 
statistical corrections are necessary but not always done properly in published 
articles. In 26% of the articles in the journal NeuroImage, a journal with an impact 
factor between 5 and 6 and specialized in brain imaging studies, the corrections were 
not properly done and therefore results might include false positive voxels (Bennett et 
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al., 2009). Worth mentioning is the second part of the article of Bennett et al. (2009), 
where they show how results get distorted, if corrections are not done properly. They 
put a dead salmon in an fMRI and examined the brain activity of the dead fish. 
Without statistical corrections the salmon did show brain activity. After correcting for 
multiple comparisons the salmon returned to his true dead state.  
Vul et al. (2009) focused on another statistical problem of fMRI studies of emotion, 
personality and social cognition. They showed that correlations in fMRI studies 
between brain activity and personality measures might be higher than expected when 
looking at the reliabilities of the compared measures. Reliability is an upper bound of 
correlation and Vul et al. (2009) were puzzled by the fact that some studies reported 
higher correlations than possible due to their expected correlation between 
personality measures and fMRI data and tried to figure out why. The reason for these 
too high correlations was that they had been computed incorrectly. Some authors 
only counted voxels whose correlations between individual voxels and a certain other 
measure passed a certain threshold. This “method” leads to a higher correlation, 
because it neglects all other voxels whose correlations are low and thus speak 
against the correlation as demonstrated in figure12.  
 
Figure 12: Demonstration of how puzzling high correlations might happen. Every measure is correlated with an individual 
voxel. Only those voxels whose correlations are beyond a specific threshold are used for the final correlation analysis 
between the activated voxels and the behavioral measure. (Vul et al, 2009) 
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Using this method to demonstrate the relation between, for example, intelligence and 
height would mean that you only use participants for the correlation analysis who 
have an IQ beyond a specific threshold and then conclude results for the whole 
sample. This is nonsense, a way in which data was processed in some fMRI studies 
analysed by Vul et al. (2009). 
Another major problem concerning brain images is the problem of causality. These 
images of the brain – though very sophisticated ones– are just images. You cannot 
be sure whether the activation depicted in them is due to an independent variable or 
to any other variable which cannot be controlled. The complexity of the brain makes it 
very difficult to establish causality, because to guarantee causality, it is necessary to 
be sure that only one variable is responsible for the change in brain activity.  
The BOLD signal is an indirect measure of brain activity and the mental activity 
associated with the area and thus causes controversy as well. The central 
assumption is that the more oxygenated blood there is in a specific area the higher is 
the brain activity and the higher the activity in a specific area the more is this area 
involved in the task presented during the fMRI (Umilta, 2011).  
This assumption is a big one. That the brain needs oxygen to work is common 
knowledge, but nobody knows how much oxygen it takes for a specific area to work 
properly. Maybe the amount of oxygen needed to generate a specific amount of 
activity varies between different brain areas and/or is not linear. A more efficient area 
would not be represented properly in the fMRI. Assuming that brain activity means 
mental activity in the first places is already a big assumption already discussed 
above.  
Even if we knew the relation of blood needed there is still the problem of pre-emptive 
blood flow, found by Sirotin and Das (2009) and summarized well by Leopold (2009) 
(Harrison & Ross, 2010). Sirotin and Das (2009) taught two monkeys that they get 
juice if they fixate a certain visual stimulus. They measured the BOLD signal and the 
underlying neural activity separately and both measures showed a good, but not 
perfect, match. In the second condition they did the same experiment without the 
visual stimulus. The results showed that there was blood flow even if there was no 
stimulus, which led to a significant mismatch of the BOLD signal and neural activity 
(Sirotin & Das, 2009). The explanation was that the brain pre-emptively sent blood to 
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brain regions by an unknown anticipatory mechanism in expectation of a stimulus. 
For neuroeconomic research this means that expectations have to be taken into 
account, because if participants know or have a clue what is about to come this might 
change the results significantly. Knowing that most of the participants are students of 
economics or psychology, it is possible that they know what the experiments are 
about and unconsciously change the results due to expectations.  
Another problem of brain images is the way results are created. Every experiment 
needs an experimental and a control condition. The effect of the experimental 
condition is computed by subtracting the results of the experimental condition from 
those of the control condition and by dividing the result by the standard deviation of 
the sample. In neuroeconomic experiments this means that in an fMRI the BOLD 
signal is measured, when the subject is lying in the scanner either doing nothing or 
doing the experiment. Both results are subtracted from each other and divided by the 
standard deviation of the sample and this is the experimental effect. Umilta (2011), 
however, points out that cognitive subtraction only works if mental functions and brain 
activities and their change over time are known in great detail. Thus, even the 
simplest of tasks are very difficult to analyse due to the complexity of the human 
brain (Umilta, 2011). 
 
3.6.3 Ethical issues 
 
Neuroeconomic experimenters find themselves confronted with ethical problems as 
well, like for example the injection of contrast substance into healthy human beings. 
This contrast substance is radioactive although exposure is very low. How much 
suffering is acceptable for science, because those injections can be painful? 
Electromagnetic fields of fMRI bear health risks as well (Zichy, 2011, p. 318). 
Jones (2007) points out that transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), which leads to 
a temporal lesion of the brain, is not of minimal risk either. Possible side effects might 
range from headaches to seizures of psychosis. Knoch, Pascual-Leone and Fehr 
(2007) therefore only used 1-Hz repetitive TMS, whose risks are minimal for 
populations without predisposing conditions. Additionally, they followed the 
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guidelines, chose only volunteers and gave them all information they needed about 
TMS, including possible side effects and discomforts.  
Another point of discussion is deception. In some experiments participants are told 
that they play against a human, whereas they play against a computer. This may 
sound harmless besides the fact that deception might change reasons for specific 
behavior and therefore falsify results. But where is the limit of deception, where do 
we draw the line?  
Besides the studies themselves the use of the results poses an ethical issue (Zichy, 
2011, p. 319). In 1-8% of the studies the brain imaging techniques show irregularities 
like tumors (Zichy, 2011, p. 319). Heinemann et al. (2008) recommend for brain 
imaging studies that the scientist should inform the test subject that incidental 
findings might occur and that those will be reported to the subject if they want to 
know them. According to Zichy (2011, p. 321), there are three more problems that 
might occur in the future, if results are not used in an ethical way.  
The first problem occurs if scientists really encode the brain and know which region is 
responsible for which function. This will lead to us becoming transparent individuals. 
The second problem is about controlling behavior or actions of individuals. Knoch et 
al. (2009) showed that disruption of the prefrontal cortex influences the ability to build 
reputation (cf. 3.7.1.). In the future scientists may be able to disrupt, for example, the 
brain area which is responsible for aggression. This will confront humanity with big 
ethical questions. 
The third problem according to Zichy (2011, p. 322) is that we might be able to use 
the resources of the brain directly without the owner of the brain as a “super-
computer”. This sounds like Science Fiction, but nevertheless might be possible in 
the distant future. 
 
3.6.4 Summary 
 
There are three fields of criticism on neuroeconomics: justification, methodology and 
ethics. Methodological problems are the easiest to solve in theory. It is possible to 
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increase sample sizes and make them representative for the population. Alpha 
corrections to avoid false positives are easily feasible as well. Ethical issues can be 
met by installing or strengthening ethic committees which already exist in most 
universities and have to allow research beforehand. Justification problems are best 
solved by trying to get results which are new and useful for economic theory. The 
next chapter shows a number of results of neuroeconomic research and makes 
chances and issues visible. 
 
3.7. Neural basis of cooperative behaviour 
 
This chapter gives insight into the current neuroeconomic research of cooperation. 
The most important structures involved are the prefrontal cortex and the reward 
system. Of special interest in the prefrontal cortex are the right dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (rDLPFC), the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC). In the reward system the focus will be put on the striatum. 
After a short presentation of studies that will confirm that the PFC and the reward 
system are important for cooperation, the studies will be analysed in the light of the 
critical areas of legitimation, methodology and ethics, to show that these problems 
are also relevant for articles that 
were published in big journals like 
Nature or Science. 
 
3.7.1. Prefrontal Cortex (PFC) 
The PFC lies at the very anterior 
end of the frontal lobe 
approximately in the Brodmann 
areas 9-14, 45 and 46. It is 
assumed that the prefrontal cortex 
plays an important role in cognitive 
control, the ability to form thoughts 
Figure 13: The left and the right prefrontal lobes (Pinel, 2009, p. 16) 
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and action according to the internal goals (Miller & Cohen, 2001). This means that 
the PFC is important for top-down processes that are conscious and related to 
internal representations of goals. Applied to cooperation this means that the PFC 
compares the options and results of social and self-interest preferences and has to 
mediate the conflict.  
 Right Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex (DLPFC) 
Results of neuroeconomic studies show that the right DLPFC plays an important role 
in cooperative behavior (Knoch et al., 2006; 2008; 2009; 2010; Rilling et al., 2007; 
Sanfey et al., 2003; Suzuki et al., 2011).  
Suzuki et al. (2011) conducted an fMRI study, where 17 participants were scanned 
while playing random matching repeated prisoner´s dilemmas and the partners were 
changed every round. To make indirect reciprocity or reputation building possible 
they showed the participants histories of the previous actions of their partners. 
Experimental results of this study show that people tend to cooperate more with 
people with good or unknown records than with those with bad, non-cooperative 
records (Suzuki et al., 2011). Results of the fMRI showed that there was increased 
neural activity in the right DLPFC, when players were interacting with partners with 
bad records and therefore not cooperating (Suzuki et al., 2011). That higher 
activation of the right DLPFC leads to higher rates of defection was also shown in the 
study of Rilling et al. (2007). The right DLPFC therefore seems to be responsible for 
long term thinking (Knoch et al., 2009) and for inhibiting predominant responses in a 
top-down manner (Miller & Cohen, 2001). This means that the predominant response 
in this study might have been to cooperate (Suzuki et al., 2011) and the higher 
activation of the right DLPFC in the bad record condition made the participants 
overcome this desire.  
Now we know that the right DLPFC shows higher activation in a game that measures 
cooperation due to indirect reciprocity, but we cannot draw the causal conclusion that 
the right DLPFC lights up because of indirect reciprocity. Brain imaging methods 
alone cannot prove that the right DLPFC is solely responsible for the results.  
To confirm this causal relationship Knoch et al. (2009) disrupted the right and the left 
DLPFC of 87 subjects with repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) and let 
them play trust games, where under one condition the players knew the decision 
50 
 
records of their partners in the game. Results showed that disruption of the right 
DLPFC negates the effect of the decision records and therefore cooperative behavior 
did not increase in the condition with known records (Knoch et al., 2009). Participants 
were unable to include long term information into the decision due to the lesion set.  
Additionally, higher activation of the right DLPFC led to changes in behavior for the 
sake of long term maximisation of utility in Suzuki et al. (2011), whereas participants 
with reduced right DLPFC activation in Knoch et al (2009) did not change their 
behavior despite knowledge of past records. So it is possible to conclude that there is 
a causal relationship between activation of the right DLPFC and the ability to build 
reputation or to be able to reciprocate indirectly. 
Another function of the DLPFC is cognitive control, which means that actions are in 
line with the internal goals (Miller & Cohen, 2001). When facing an unfair offer, this 
internal conflict between maximisation of income and rejecting the unfair offer leads 
to an increased activation of the right DLPFC (Sanfey et al., 2003). A lower activation 
of the right DLPFC leads therefore to an increased acceptance rate of unfair offers 
because of the missing conflict. To test this hypothesis, Knoch et al (2006) used 
rTMS to disrupt the right DLPFC of players and let them play ultimatum games. The 
results, illustrated in figure 14 confirmed that inhibition of the right DLPFC leads to 
higher acceptance rates of unfair offers when playing against human partners. 
(Knoch et al, 2006). 
This study allows the causal conclusion that the higher right DLPFC activity in a 
conflict between fairness motives and self-interest is the more probable it is that 
fairness motives are executed (Knoch et al., 2006). An important aspect of fairness is 
punishing unfair behavior. Assuming that the lower the activity of the right DLPFC is 
the less important fairness motives are, low activity of the right DLPFC would lead to 
a decrease in altruistic punishment. Knoch et al. (2008) tested this hypothesis by 
inhibiting the right DLPFC of 128 participants playing one-shot ultimatum games. 
Punishing unfair behavior in the ultimatum game happens by rejecting offers, so that 
nobody gets any money. Results confirmed indeed that punishment of unfair 
behavior decreased if the right DLPFC was inhibited (Figure 14) (Knoch et al., 2008). 
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Figure 14: Left: Acceptance rates of the different treatment groups (Knoch, 2006, p. 829); Middle: Perceived unfairness of 
offers across treatment groups (Knoch, 2006, p. 829); Right: Acceptance rates of different offers across treatments 
(Knoch, 2008, p. 1989) 
 
An EEG study of Knoch et al. (2010) confirms the relationship between neural activity 
in the DLPFC and acceptance rates of unfair offers. They let the participants play 
ultimatum games while simultaneously using EEG to measure cortical activity and 
found significant positive correlations between resting current density in the right 
lateral PFC and acceptance rates of unfair offers (Knoch et al., 2010). The level of 
activity in this area is also a good predictor of individuals’ punishment behavior, 
because prediction worked for fair and unfair offers and can therefore be used 
independently from that measure (Knoch et al., 2010) 
Another interesting result of Knoch et al. was that although acceptance rates were 
higher, the perception of the offer did not change despite the inhibition of the right 
DLPFC (Figure 14, right) (Knoch et al., 2006; 2008). This means that subjects 
accepted unfair offers, even if they were aware of the offers being unfair. They were 
unable to execute the social norm of fairness which might pose a threat to society if 
this method was abused and carried out on a large scale. Thus, the importance of the 
right DLPFC for social appropriate behavior was confirmed (Knoch et al, 2006). 
 Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex (VMPFC) 
The results of different studies indicate that the VMPFC plays an important role for 
cooperative behavior (de Quervain et al., 2004; Rilling et al., 2002; 2004; Koenigs & 
Tranel, 2007; Tricomi et al., 2010). This area is associated with the integration of 
cognitive operations for a higher goal and with involvement in difficult choices (de 
Quervain et al., 2004). This means that the VMPFC is involved in taking others into 
C 
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account. Tricomi et al. (2010) showed that VMPFC activation is associated with the 
social preference of inequality aversion. Patients with VMPFC damage on the other 
hand are short tempered, angry and irritable (Koenigs & Tranel, 2007). Brain imaging 
studies and a lesion study will be presented to confirm the importance of this brain 
region for cooperative behavior.  
The VMPFC showed higher activation in iterated prisoner´s dilemmas and in 
ultimatum games, when comparing the activation levels of costly vs. costless 
punishment of the opponent (de Quervain et al., 2004). Costly punishment led to 
higher activation of the VMPFC than costless punishment, which reflects the inner 
conflict that arises under the first condition. Contrary to costless punishment the 
player has to sacrifice his own money for punishing unfair behavior. Additionally, 
people with lesions in this area tend to reject unfair offers in ultimatum games more 
often than healthy people (Koenigs & Tranel, 2007). A possible explanation for this 
phenomenon is that they are unable to see the benefit of the offer and only perceive 
the unfairness of the behavior and punish it. 
In the prisoner´s dilemma the activation of the VMPFC was higher, when both players 
were cooperating, which is again an indicator that this area is responsible for the 
integration of different cognitive operations like taking others into account (Rilling et 
al., 2002; 2004). These activations only occurred when the games were played 
between humans (Rilling et al., 2004). There was no significant activation in 
conditions where a computer was the opponent.  
 Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) 
The ACC is associated with cognitive control and the detection of cognitive conflicts 
(Botvinick et al., 2001). The anterior cingulate cortex showed higher activation for 
unfair offers in ultimatum games (Sanfey et al., 2003). In this case the cognitive 
conflict is caused by the wish of getting at least a little money set against the 
temptation of punishing the opponent for his unfair offer. The feeling of envy also 
leads to an activation of the ACC. In this case the cognitive conflict lies within the 
person, because one`s self-concept is threatened by others (Takahashi et al., 2009). 
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3.7.2. Reward System/Striatum 
 
Many neuroeconomic studies showed 
activation of the striatum in situations related 
to cooperative behavior (Rilling et al., 2002; 
2004; de Quervain et al., 2004; King-Casas et 
al, 2005; Tom et al., 2007; Seymour et al., 
2007; Fliessman et al., 2007 and Tabibnia et 
al., 2008). The striatum consists of the 
putamen and the caudate and is part of the 
reward system.  
It is assumed to be activated because mutual cooperation is rewarding and this 
reward makes us overcome the temptation to act selfishly and therefore leads to 
further cooperation and to the next “kick” (Rilling et al., 2004). Rilling et al. (2002) 
made an fMRI study, where the participants played iterated prisoner´s dilemmas and 
stated in post scan interviews that mutual cooperation was the most satisfying 
outcome for them. To find out if the rewarding effect of cooperation depends on the 
social interaction or on the maximisation of the benefit of the game, they let the 
participants play the same game against computers. Under this new condition no 
stratial activation occurred. Therefore, it was confirmed that this effect is only related 
to social interactions with humans (Rilling et al., 2002). The opposite results were 
found regarding the effects of defection. There it had no influence whether the 
participants played against computers or humans. Both conditions showed 
decreased striatal activation and the loss of expected material rewards was always 
perceived as negative (Rilling et al., 2004).  
It could be shown that not only a bad result itself - in our case defection - leads to a 
reduced reaction of the striatum. Even the prospect or the expectation of getting 
betrayed is enough to decrease activation levels of the striatum (Rilling et al., 2004). 
Most humans are loss averse, which means that they do not like losing and therefore 
try to avoid it. The neural correlate of loss aversion is thus the striatum, which shows 
less activation, whenever a loss is expected. The striatum, on the other hand, is 
activated in the case of positive expectations. It shows increased activity in actions 
that are related to rewards (Rilling et al., 2004; Seymour et al., 2007). The prediction 
Figure 15: Anteroventral striatum in an fMRI (Rilling et 
al., 2002) 
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or expectation of a positive reward or punishment, particularly altruistic punishment, 
activates the anterior part of the striatum and the prediction or expectation of 
negative events leads to an activation in the posterior area of the striatum (Seymour 
et al., 2007). This result of Seymour et al. (2007) is contrary to the result of Rilling et 
al. (2004), who measured less activation in the striatum, whenever losses were 
expected. It speaks against Rilling et al. (2004) that their results had a p-value of only 
0.03, which is too low for fMRI studies due to the risk of false positive results, as 
explained in section 3.6.2. The two studies used completely different methods, which 
might influence comparability. Whereas Rilling et al. (2004) let the participants play 
one-shot prisoner´s dilemmas, Seymour et al. (2007) let them play a simple lottery 
without a social context. Seymour et al. (2007) offer a second explanation besides 
the mentioned methodological differences: According to them, it might be possible 
that the experimental setting, where you get a certain sum of money for participating 
creates a positive frame that leads to positive expectations for the task and therefore 
influences the activity of the striatum (Seymour et al., 2007). 
The experiments cited above show that the striatum is related to the good feeling of 
cooperation by making cooperation and even punishment of defection rewarding. 
Fliessbach et al. (2007) wanted to find out if social comparison influences the reward 
processing function or if only the absolute height of the reward matters. Their 
hypothesis was that the activity of the reward system is higher, the higher the relative 
reward is (Fliessbach et al., 2007). To test their hypothesis they let participants do an 
estimation task in pairs, while they were both in an fMRI scanner. The task was 
constructed in a way that both participants had a high chance (80%) of getting all the 
items right (Fliessbach et al., 2007). Then they were told how much person A would 
get and how much person B. If both of them had all the items right they were told 
three different relative heights of income: both got the same amount of money, or 
player A or player B two times more income. To check if the absolute height was 
important, they constructed each condition in a way that the players got the same 
relative amount but different absolute amounts of money (for example: high= 60€; 
low= 30€).  
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The results in figure 16 show that the 
activation of the ventral striatum strongly 
depended on the relative height of the 
payment. The BOLD signals of the 
different conditions did not change 
significantly under conditions with 
absolute high and low incomes, but there 
was a significant increase as far as the 
relative height of the income was 
concerned. The BOLD signal was stronger in the condition where the tested person 
got more than the other participant. If both got the same amount, there was only little 
hemodynamic response, although they got money. Lower responses were measured, 
if the participant got less than the other person, although they still got money. 
(Fliessbach, 2007) 
This shows that not only the absolute amount of a reward is important for striatal 
activity, but also the relative income has to be taken into account. The study of 
Tabibnia et al. (2008) confirms that the fairness of an offer moderates the effect of a 
reward on the striatum or the reward system in general.  
De Quervain et al. (2004) showed that punishing the loss of expected material 
rewards or unfair behavior in general can also be rewarding and activates the dorsal 
striatum. It is not enough to punish symbolically, only punishment that reduces the 
defector´s outcome activates the dorsal striatum. The more activated the dorsal 
striatum gets, the higher is the willingness to punish defectors, even if it is costly for 
oneself (de Quervain et al., 2004).  
The activity level of the striatum is not only an indicator of current expected loss or 
reward, but also a predictor of how a person will act and react in the future (King-
Casas et al. 2005). In iterated prisoner´s dilemmas King-Casas et al. (2005) found 
out that response magnitude and response timing were good predictors for future 
cooperation (King-Casas et al. 2005). Response magnitude reflects the expected 
future reward of the next rounds. If trust is high that the partner will reciprocate in the 
next rounds, the expected reward increases and this leads to a higher activation of 
the caudate which is part of the striatum. Response timing also changes over time, 
Figure 16: Parameter estimates of activation across scenarios 
with different relative income (Fliessbach, 2007, p. 1307) 
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as participants get to know each other and learn how the other person reacts. This is 
taken this into account when calculating the expected future reward.  
Another function of the striatum is that it makes us mistrust betrayers. Negative 
feelings due to low striatal activation are related to the betrayal so that we learn that 
betrayers should not be trusted again in the future (Rilling et al., 2004). 
 
3.7.3. Oxytocin 
 
For the topic of cooperative behavior hormones associated with social behavior are 
interesting and oxytocin is the most famous representative. Oxytocin is a 
neuropeptide that is released from the pituitary gland into the blood stream. The 
release is triggered by action potentials. It plays a key-role in the process of bonding 
(for example during childbirth) and is responsible for female milk secretion (Kosfeld et 
al., 2005). Oxytocin is also released in response to socially relevant stressors and to 
social interaction (Heinrichs & Domes, 2008). It affects the amygdala by lowering 
emotional and social stimuli that are associated with autonomic arousal and promote 
social interpretations of signals (Heinrichs & Domes, 2008). 
Therefore Kosfeld et al. (2005) hypothesized that oxytocin might also promote 
prosocial behavior like trust. To test their hypothesis they gave the subjects 
intranasal oxytocin and let them play one-shot trust games with strangers. Results 
showed that investors (subjects who first give money to the trustees) transferred 
significantly more money when oxytocin was applied than the control group that 
received a placebo (Figure 17, left). On the other hand the amount transferred back 
to the investor by the trustee was not different between the two groups (Figure 17, 
right) (Kosfeld et al., 2005).  
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Figure 17: Left: transfer trustee to investor in trust games, Right: transfer investor to trustee in trust games (Kosfeld et 
al., 2005, p. 674-675) 
 
This means that oxytocin promotes trust but not trustworthiness. Kosfeld et al. (2005) 
explained this result saying that investors and trustees face different situations. Trust 
is more important for the investors than for the trustees, for whom reciprocity is more 
important than trust (Kosfeld et al., 2005). This is why oxytocin affects investors more 
than trustees. Thus, it increases the willingness to bear social risks due to 
interpersonal interaction. Kosfeld et al. (2005) also showed that oxytocin does not 
work in an interaction where the social aspect is missing by letting a random 
mechanism determine the transfer of money back to the investor in the so called risk 
game. Under this condition both groups showed no difference in trusting behavior.  
Kosfeld et al. (2005) showed that the application of oxytocin increases trusting 
behavior. To determine if and how oxytocin is at work in trusting behavior without 
artificial application, Zak et al. (2005) let the participants play one shot trust games 
and then measured oxytocin levels of trustees and investors. It is interesting that Zak 
et al. (2005) could not measure higher oxytocin levels in the investors but in the 
trustees they did. This contradicts the results of Kosfeld et al. (2005) mentioned 
above. No explanation for this contradiction is offered, however, although Zak was 
involved in both papers. 
Baumgartner et al. (2008) expanded the design of Kosfeld et al. (2005) by an fMRI 
study to gain a deeper understanding of the neural mechanisms of trust. They found 
out that in the trust game the amygdala and the midbrain were less activated in the 
oxytocin condition, where the participants received intranasal oxytocin (Baumgartner 
et al., 2008). It is assumed that one function of the amygdala and the midbrain is the 
modulation of emotions, for example fear, and low activation of them indicates low 
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levels of fear, which is good for cooperation (Baumgartner et al., 2008). This study 
again confirms that social interaction is necessary to make oxytocin work, because 
there was no significant difference between the oxytocin and the placebo group in 
transfers in the risk game condition where the results were solely determined by a 
computer. 
 
3.7.4. A critical view on the results 
 
All studies discussed in the last chapters offered interesting new insights into well-
known economic problems. There were countless papers on experimental games 
before, but neuroeconomic research gave the topic a new direction. The combination 
of neuroscience and economics makes it possible to use neuroscientific knowledge 
for economic questions.  
The most important contribution of neuroeconomics is in the form of additional data, 
which is used to decode the construction plan of the brain. This data is not only of 
interest for economists but also for other disciplines like psychology or neuroscience, 
because they are written in a language all fields understand. So neuroeconomics 
offers a common ground today and might lead to the unification of these three 
disciplines in the future. 
Confronted with the immense complexity of the brain, neuroeconomic research can 
be said to be still at the beginning. As research mainly works on a descriptive level, 
neuroscientific findings are often rather speculations and assumptions than proofs. 
Brain imaging studies, for example, do not allow causal conclusions and whether 
specific forms of behavior can be matched to single brain areas in a one to one 
fashion is still a field of intensive research. Also methodological problems can distort 
the results, as shown above in chapter 3.6.2.. Therefore, neuroscientific results 
should be looked at critically and not be taken as absolute. 
Looking at neuroscientific research papers, the method section tend to be strikingly 
short. Most only contain the number of participants, the game played and the used 
neuroscientific method. The numbers of participants make it clear why 
neuroeconomic research is criticised so much. They range from 14 (de Quervain et 
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al., 2004, published in “Science”) to 87 (Knoch et al., 2010, published in 
“Psychological Science”) and are not representative as far age or education were 
concerned (most participants were students). According to Bortz and Döring (2006, p. 
629) at least 22 subjects are necessary to calculate correlations with appropriate test 
power at a significance level of 0.05 under the condition that a big correlation is 
expected. The standard significance level for neuroeconomic research is 0.001, 
which increases the necessary sample tremendously, not considering the power or 
the expected effect sizes. 
According to Bennett et al (2009) significance levels might be too high and therefore 
provoke false positive results. When corrections for multiple testing were done, this 
was hardly ever mentioned in the methods sections.  
To evaluate the potential of those methods, besides significance effect sizes are 
important to know. The reason is that significance only tells if there is an effect, but 
does not tell the impact, therefore effect sizes are needed. Unfortunately effect sizes 
are often not documented in papers.  
Knoch et al. (2009), however, do offer effect sizes in the supporting information of 
their paper on the disruption of the DLPFC with rTMS. They used multiple 
regressions to calculate the effect of TMS on the trustee in a trust game. The 
explained variance R2 of the rTMS is a good measure for the effect. Unfortunately, 
only the R2 for the whole multiple regression analysis with all predictors was given. 
Therefore it was not possible to extract the effect of the rTMS. According to Bortz and 
Döring (2006, p. 606) an R2 of 0.01 reflects a small, 0.1 a medium and 0.25 a big 
effect. The whole model of Knoch et al. (2009) explains 13% of variance, which 
stands for a medium effect. Furthermore, they only calculated regressions for the 
condition, where the temptation to defect was highest. This means that TMS had a 
significant effect on the trustee in the trust game, but it was only medium for the 
whole model and limited to conditions with high temptation. 
In the study of Knoch et al. (2008) tDCS was used to measure the effect of disruption 
of the right DLPFC of responders in an ultimatum game. The calculation of the effect 
size for Knoch et al. (2008) showed a medium effect. The effect size was calculated 
by transforming the Z-value of the difference of the most unfair offer between groups 
with and without tDCS into a correlation coefficient (Field, 2009, p. 550). This works 
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by dividing the Z-Value (2.244) by the square root of the total number of participants 
(√64). The resulted correlation coefficient of 0.28 reflects a medium effect (Bortz & 
Döring, 2006, p. 6064). 
Knoch et al. (2006) use rTMS to disrupt the right DLPFC and measure the effect on 
the responder. To calculate the size of the effect, the z-value was transformed in a 
correlation coefficient by dividing it (2.388) by the square root of total number of 
participants (√35). The result of 0.4 can be interpreted according to Bortz and Döring 
(2006, p. 606) as a medium to big effect. 
Kosfeld et al. (2005) applied oxytocin on half of the investors of a trust game. The 
results demonstrated that oxytocin had a significant effect on trusting behavior. To 
find out how dangerous oxytocin is, the magnitude of the effect was calculated by 
dividing the z-value of the U-Test (1.897) between the oxytocin and placebo group by 
the square root of the total number of investors (√58). The result of 0.25 indicates a 
medium effect of oxytocin.  
The medium effect sizes in all studies cited above show that manipulation of brain 
activity really works and has some effect. Therefore it is necessary to think about the 
implications of these results. 
Furthermore, scientists have to be careful when using methods like TMS or DCS. 
The experience of manipulation can be disturbing for the participants especially when 
they are unable to defend themselves against it. Therefore strict controls of these 
methods are necessary, because they might bear risks that do not justify the 
research that is done now. 
  
                                                          
4
 small effect: 0,1; medium effect: 0,3; big effect: 0,5 
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4. Cooperative behavior in the light of genoeconomics 
 
4.1. Definition and introduction into genetics 
 
Genoeconomics is an interdisciplinary field that uses genetics, especially behavioral 
genetics, to study questions of economics. Its aim is to investigate which aspects of 
human behavior are related to genes and how much is related to other factors like 
education, personality, situation or society. Therefore genoeconomics targets a very 
fundamental question. How much of human behavior is determined by genes and 
how much is determined by the environment?  
This question is called the nature vs. nurture conflict, which has been going on for 
thousands of years. To illustrate how important this question is let us assume 
scientists find out that human behavior is solely determined by the genetic code. This 
would mean that changes in the environment would not change the way humans act. 
Therefore, any intervention and investment into a person would be futile, because 
you know that he or she does not have the genetic equipment to make the 
investment work. On the other hand, if scientists find out that genes had no influence 
on human behavior, it would not make a difference who the natural parents of a child 
are, because the only thing that would count is who raises the child. It is extremely 
unlikely, however, that these extreme positions are true. Both nature and nurture are 
believed to form the human being. 
 
4.2. A Brief introduction into genetics 
 
4.2.1. DNA 
 
DNA stands for deoxyribonucleic acid and is the blueprint of life. It consists of sugars 
connected with nucleobases, bound together by phosphates (Bazzett, 2008, p. 26). 
There are four different kinds of DNA bases: adenine, cytosine, guanine and thymine. 
DNA adopts the form of the famous double helix. The phosphates and sugars form 
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the backbone and the nucleobases interact with their counterparts by hydrogen 
bonds.. Adenine always binds to thymine and guanine always to cytosine. These 
different base sequences are the construction plan of amino acids, which form 
proteins that are required for life (Bazzett, 2008, p. 33). DNA is stored in the cell core 
and the storage compartment is called chromosome. 
 
4.2.2. Genes 
 
Genes are the smallest essential piece of information for the construction of one 
amino acid. This information consists of three nucleobases which are called a codon. 
The genome is the sum of all genes and therefore contains all information of the 
organism. Amino acids are assembled in the cytoplasm outside of the cell core. To 
get the genetic information out of the core, messenger RNA is needed. Outside the 
core mRNA attaches to ribosomes, where the synthesis of the amino acids takes 
place. (Bazzett, 2008, p.43f) 
 
4.3. Methods of genoeconomics 
 
4.3.1. Heritability studies 
 
The genotype is the genetic information humans receive from their parents while the 
phenotype describes how genetic information is “interpreted” in the offspring 
(Bazzett, 2008, p. 124). The variance of the phenotype is the sum of the variances of 
the genotype and the environment. Therefore heritability is the share of the variance 
of the phenotype that is explained by the genotypic variance (Visscher et al., 2008). 
Simply spoken, heritability is the variation in humans related to genetic variation or 
the share of the phenotype of human behavior that is heritable to the next generation. 
So 30% heritability means that if all humans were raised in the same environment, 
there would remain 30% of the variability that is visible now and if all humans were 
clones, there still would be a variability of 70% (Navarro, 2009).  
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Twin studies are the most famous approach to study heritability. These studies want 
to reveal the genetic part of human behavior by comparing monozygotic and fraternal 
twins. Monozygotic twins share the same genes and the same environment, whereas 
fraternal twins only share the same environment. The difference in behavior or traits 
of monozygotic and fraternal twins must therefore be related to genetic factors, 
because environments are the same. If the difference between monozygotic and 
fraternal twins is small, genetic contribution is low and therefore heritability is low. If 
the difference is high, genetics is strongly related to the variance in behavior or any 
other trait and heritability is high. 
There are two big problems with twin studies. First, twins are not representative of 
the whole population (Navarro, 2008) and second, twins do not share an identic 
environment but only a very similar one. A second way to study heritability is by 
comparing adoptees with biological children raised in the same family (Beauchamp et 
al., 2011).  
Heritability studies can tell us if a trait or a specific behavior is related to the 
genotype. But they cannot tell which genes and to which extent. Heritability serves as 
an upper limit of explained variance by the sum of single genes. Association studies 
can identify genes that are associated with specific traits or behavior.  
 
4.3.2. Candidate gene association studies 
 
Association studies compare allelic5 frequencies for groups with specific attributes 
with a control group on a quantitative trait (Plomin et al., 2008, p. 108). In candidate 
gene association studies specific genes are assumed to be related to specific 
behavior and therefore the differences in these genes between high and low scoring 
subjects are calculated to measure the relationship. A problem is that these 
hypotheses are not supported well by theories because it might be possible that 
hundreds or thousands of genes are equally responsible for a single behavioral 
aspect. A second problem is that replication of results seems to be difficult (Plomin et 
                                                          
5
 Allele is an alternative form of a gene. Different blood types are different alleles of the same gene. (Bazzett, 
2008, p. 44) 
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al., 2008, p. 110; Benjamin, 2010; Beauchamp et al., 2011). This is an indicator that 
these studies are underpowered, which would lead to high rates of false positive 
results. One possible solution would be to increase sample size. 
 
4.3.3. Genome wide association studies 
 
Genome-wide association studies examine variation of behavior due to genetic 
variation without a priori hypotheses (Navarro, 2009; Plomin et al., 2008, p. 111). 
This means that hundred thousands of markers are tested for a relationship to a 
specific behavior. This approach became possible due to the availability of 
microarrays, which can genotype possible genetic markers on a little chip (Plomin et 
al., 2008, p. 111f). This reduced the costs of genotyping to around 500$ per 
individual and they are still falling by half every second year (Benjamin, 2010). These 
studies result in many genes with small effect sizes that are associated with the 
researched behavior (Plomin et al., 2008, p. 113). This data mining approach leads to 
an increase in false positive results due to multiple testing of genetic association for 
hundreds or thousands of genes in the same sample and therefore alpha level 
corrections are necessary (Navarro, 2009). Without corrections chances would be 
high that positive results are just artefacts or coincidence due to the fact that you 
“asked the same person hundred thousands of questions”. Therefore replication 
studies are crucial to detect these false positive results. 
 
4.4. Possible contributions of genetics to economics 
 
There are three ways in which genetics might contribute to economics in the future. 
First, genetic markers can be used as diagnostic tool. A profound knowledge of the 
function of specific genes might be used in screening tests to predict a certain 
behavior or to invest in prevention programmes, if genetic markers are known to be 
associated with specific diseases (Beauchamp et al., 2011). 
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Secondly, genetic information might be used as control variables in settings where 
omitted and reverse causality are an issue (Beauchamp et al., 2011). If we know that 
40 % of the variation in behavior in the ultimatum game is associated with genetic 
factors, it might be possible to control the outcome of the game for the genetic part 
and therefore to lower bias (Beauchamp et al., 2011). 
A third possible contribution of genetics to economics is that genetic data might be 
helpful in understanding different responses to the same intervention between 
different individuals (Beauchamp et al., 2011).  
 
4.5. Issues in genoeconomics 
 
4.5.1. Low test power 
 
Test power is the probability that a test of significance rejects a hypothesis and the 
rejection is right (Bortz & Döring, 2006, p. 602). Three components influence test 
power: Level of significance, effect size and sample size (Bortz & Döring, 2006, 
p.603). The lower the significance level, the lower is the test power. The higher the 
effect size, the higher the test power and the bigger the sample, the higher is the test 
power (Bortz & Döring, 2006, p. 603). 
Those three components illustrate why huge sample sizes are needed in modern 
association studies to identify genes which are associated with specific behavior. As 
explained above, significance levels must be corrected due to multiple testing to 
reduce false positive results leading to reduced test power. Furthermore, the genetic 
effect per gene is very small, because a combination of many genes is assumed to 
be responsible for complex social behavior like cooperation. The only component 
which can be influenced easily is the sample size and therefore huge sample sizes 
have to compensate small effect sizes and very small levels of significance. 
Beauchamp et al. (2011) give a good example what this means. At a significance 
level of 5% you need 4000 subjects to have the power of 50% to detect a marker that 
explains 0.1 % of the variance (Beauchamp et al., 2011 , p. 73). Now imagine the 
necessary sample size to get 80% of power at a significance level of 5 x 10-8 for a 
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marker that explains only 0.01% of variance. You need ten thousands of subjects. 
This is one reason why replications of association studies fail that often. Most studies 
do not test enough subjects to reach sufficient test power and false positive results 
are the consequence. 
 
4.5.2. False positives 
 
Multiple testing and therefore correction of the significance level and underpowered 
studies lead to false positive results, which get published but do not hold in 
replication studies. This damages the reputation of genetic studies. Therefore 
scientists try to bundle their resources to conduct studies with sufficient sample sizes 
to get results that are replicable (Benjamin, 2010). The funds necessary are huge, 
but costs of genome encoding have fallen drastically in recent years (Plomin et al., 
2008, p. 111; Benjamin, 2010). Additionally, guidelines were created to ensure high 
quality of reported results in genetic association studies. The STREGA initiative 
(strengthening the reporting of genetic association studies) for example has the aim 
to increase transparency in genetic research (Little et al., 2009). Areas covered in 
their guideline are for example population stratification, genotyping errors, replication, 
selection of participants, rationale for choice of genes, statistical methods and 
reporting of descriptive and outcome data (Little et al., 2009). 
 
4.5.3. Ethical issues 
 
The possibility of predicting the future by using genetic information leads to ethical 
problems. It is already possible to test individuals for a number of single-gene 
disorders like Huntington´s disease (Plomin et al., 2008, p. 107). Insurances and 
employers would pay a lot of money for this kind of information if testing was carried 
out on a larger scale.  
In the distant future it might even be possible to predict a person´s behavior by 
reading their DNA. Predicting behavior is extremely difficult, because it is determined 
by a large number of genes. Therefore we would have to know every single involved 
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gene and its interactions. Science fiction movies like GATTACA demonstrate how a 
possible future might look like, where it is possible to manipulate the genetic code to 
eliminate risk factors and to design babies with maximal potential. The society 
discriminates between those people designed and those conceived the common 
way. This movie is still science fiction, but the increasing availability of genetic data 
and the growing knowledge about the functions of specific genes, bear the risk that 
genetic information might be used for other purposes than science. Knowing that a 
person is prone to a certain illness like for example dementia is a very valuable piece 
of information. So we have to make sure that nobody misuses this new kind of data. 
 
4.6. Genoeconomic results on cooperative behavior 
 
This chapter focuses on the results of genoeconomic research related to cooperative 
behavior, particularly in connection with experimental games (cf. 2.5.). Its aim is to 
present results of current research and to show how genoeconomic research works. 
The results will be discussed according to their chances and issues related to 
genoeconomics.  
It should be clear by now that people do not act like “homines oeconomici” in 
experimental games. An interesting question is how much of this variation in behavior 
is related to genetic variation? To calculate the heritability of cooperative behavior in 
games, Wallace et al. (2007) let monozygotic (MZ) and dizygotic (DZ) twins play 
ultimatum games and Cesarini et al. (2008) let them play trust games. Both studies 
used the same source of data, namely the “Swedish Twin Registry at Karolinska 
Institute” and had the same sample size of 658 individuals in 71 DZ and 258 MZ 
twins (Wallace et al., 2007; Cesarini et al., 2008). 
The results showed that the acceptance thresholds did not differ between MZ and DZ 
twins in ultimatum games, but the acceptance thresholds of both MZ twins were 
correlated in contrary to those of the DZ twins which did not correlate at all as 
demonstrated in figure 18 (Wallace et al., 2007). Therefore heritability can be 
assumed.  
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Figure 18: Scatterplot of ultimatum game acceptance thresholds for twin pairs: (A) Scatterplot for MZ twins, (B) 
Scatterplot for DZ twins (Wallace et al., 2007, p. 15632) 
 
Cesarini et al. (2008) demonstrated that behavior in trust games is heritable. MZ 
twins behaved more similar than DZ twins and a heritability index of 20% was 
calculated for the Swedish sample (Cesarini et al., 2008). 
These twin studies resulted in a heritability index of more than 40% for ultimatum 
games and around 20% for trust games (Wallace et al., 2007; Cesarini et al., 2008). 
This means that 40% of the variation in the ultimatum game seems to be related to 
genetic effects. Assuming that ultimatum games measure fairness, reciprocity and 
inequity aversion means that 40% of the variation in these variables might be related 
to genetic factors. In the trust game a heritability index of 20% means that 20% of the 
variation in trust and trustworthiness is related to genetics. The height of the index of 
trust and trustworthiness does not differ significantly (Cesarini et al., 2008). Variation 
in behavior in games might therefore be attributable to genes beside any other 
factors assumed by neuroeconomists or behavioral economists.  
Environment therefore accounts for 60 respectively 80% of the variation. This means 
that genetics does not have the expected importance for cooperative behavior in trust 
or ultimatum games. One plausible factor for this observation might be due to culture. 
Cesarini et al. (2008) compared the trust games results of a Swedish sample with a 
US-American sample and behavior of MZ and DZ twins differed significantly between 
the two countries, which indicates huge differences between the two cultures as far 
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as behavior in games is concerned. These observations confirm the results of 
Herrmann, Gächter and Thöni (2008) that cooperative behavior in games can vary 
strongly between different societies (cf. 2.8.). 
Over all it can be said that genes contribute to cooperative behavior in games. It has 
to be determined, however, which genes are responsible for cooperative behavior. To 
answer this question other methods like candidate genes studies or genome wide 
association studies are available.  
Hammock and Young (2005) showed that variation of the vasopressin 1a receptor 
predicts differences in social behavior of prairie voles. Based on these investigations 
Knafo et al. (2008) published a candidate gene association study, which showed that 
the length of the arginine vasopressin 1a receptor RS3 promoter region is also 
related to prosocial behavior in humans. Test subjects with short versions of this 
gene gave significantly less money in a dictator game than test subjects with long 
versions (Knafo et al., 2008).  
The results of the presented studies confirm that cooperative behavior has a genetic 
component. Due to the fact that huge samples are necessary to find out which genes 
are responsible for cooperative behavior, it will take some time to identify specific 
genes and their impact. The presented candidate gene association study showed 
that vasopressin is associated with cooperative behavior but replication is needed, 
because the sample was rather small (203). With decreasing costs more studies will 
be conducted and new genes will be found and confirmed by replication studies, but 
as long as samples stay small, results should be treated cautiously.  
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5. Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis was to introduce interdisciplinary approaches which might be 
helpful for economics. It was demonstrated with care how different fields handle the 
topic of cooperation. 
Behavioral economics uses psychological knowledge to enrich or reject economic 
theories. The concept of the homo oeconomicus was extended by other-regarding 
preferences. People do not only care about their own benefit, but also take others 
into account. Experimental games like the ultimatum game or the prisoner´s dilemma 
were used in many of the presented studies to demonstrate these other-regarding 
preferences. Although incentives, especially punishment, showed an effect in 
behavioral economic studies, they were mainly seen as a way to “communicate”, to 
tell other people that they are not acting according to the norm. Therefore 
redistribution worked as well as punishment and the possibility to communicate or to 
express ones feelings led to higher cooperation. 
Reciprocity and inequity aversion are examples of other-regarding preferences which 
were demonstrated in various studies with many different games. 
Neuroeconomics tries to combine neuroscience and economics. Economists use 
methods of neuroscience like brain imaging and temporal lesions to proof economic 
theories. This approach has been criticized a lot due to methodological, justification 
and ethical problems. The biggest chance of neuroeconomics is that it might be able 
one day to unify psychology, economics and neuroscience since all these disciplines 
research human behavior on different levels. 
The most interesting neuroeconomic studies were the lesion studies of Knoch et al., 
because they were very controversial. They used current or magnetic fields to 
influence the activity of the brain and brought astonishing results concerning the 
function of the prefrontal cortex. To evaluate how much effect those methods had, 
effect sizes were calculated and resulted in medium sized effects, which means that 
this technology has to be taken seriously and handled with caution.  
Another way to influence people is to use hormones. The example of oxytocin 
showed that the application of the bonding hormone changed cooperative behavior 
and has to be handled with care. 
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Brain imaging studies showed that the prefrontal cortex and the reward system are 
related with cooperation. Due to the fact that imaging studies are just correlative, no 
causal conclusions can be drawn from them. Lesion studies could be used to confirm 
the results of the brain imaging studies. 
The third interdisciplinary approach discussed was genoeconomics. The main 
methods of genoeconomics are heritability studies and association studies. The 
results showed that cooperative behavior is indeed heritable. To find out which genes 
are related to cooperative behavior, association studies are necessary. One problem 
is that huge samples are needed, because the effect of each gene is very small. 
Otherwise studies would be underpowered which can lead to false positive results.  
All three of the approaches under discussion showed interesting new ways towards 
the research of cooperative behavior and gathered promising information of how 
cooperation works. Especially the field of genoeconomics is still in its beginnings, but 
one can be sure that many more interesting results and striking findings towards the 
understanding of cooperation will follow in the future. 
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Abstract (English) 
 
Standard economic theory and especially the concept of the “homo oeconomicus” 
have been challenged by a number of new approaches from other scientific fields. 
This thesis will discuss three interdisciplinary approaches: Psychological knowledge 
of behavior is incorporated in the theory of behavioral economics. Neuroeconomics 
combines neuroscience with economics and tries to find answers on the neural level. 
The third approach of genoeconomics focuses on the role of genes related to 
economic behavior. To demonstrate how these approaches work, findings on 
cooperation were presented and chances and problems of the interdisciplinary 
approaches discussed. 
Behavioral economics uses experimental approaches and could show that people 
are not solely self-interested. They are also showing other-regarding preferences like 
reciprocity or inequity aversion. Neuroeconomic research found out that the prefrontal 
cortex, a mediator between social- and self-interest, and the reward system are 
activated when decisions concerning cooperation had to be made. Genoeconomics 
could prove that cooperative behavior has a genetic component. 
This thesis showed that other fields of science can contribute to economic questions. 
Although there are still problems to solve, interdisciplinary approaches can enrich 
economics. 
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Abstract (German) 
 
Die Standard Ökonomie und im Besonderen das Konzept des „Homo Ökonomicus“ 
wird durch neue Ansätze aus anderen Forschungsgebieten herausgefordert. 
Diese Diplomarbeit stellt drei interdisziplinäre Ansätze vor. Die Verhaltensökonomie 
nutzt Wissen aus der Psychologie. Die Neuroökonomie kombiniert die 
Neurowissenschaften mit der Ökonomie und versucht so, Antworten auf neuronaler 
Ebene zu finden. Der dritte Ansatz, genannt Verhaltensgenetik der Ökonomie 
(genoeconomics), konzentriert sich auf die Rolle, die Gene bei für die Ökonomie 
interessanten Verhaltensweisen spielt. Um zu demonstrieren, wie diese Ansätze 
forschen, werden die jeweiligen Ergebnisse zum Thema Kooperation vorgestellt und 
die Chancen und Probleme der interdisziplinären Ansätze diskutiert. 
Die Verhaltensökonomie nutzte experimentelle Ansätze und konnte zeigen, dass 
Menschen nicht nur egoistisch sind. Sie zeigen soziale Präferenzen wie Reziprozität 
oder Aversion gegen Ungleichheit. Die Neuroökonomie konnte zeigen, dass der 
präfrontale Cortex, ein Vermittler zwischen Egoismus und Gemeinschaftsinteresse, 
und das Belohnungzentrum aktiv sind, wenn Kooperationsentscheidungen getroffen 
werden müssen. Die Verhaltensgenetik der Ökonomie konnte zeigen, dass 
kooperatives Verhalten eine genetische Komponente besitzt. 
Diese Diplomarbeit konnte zeigen, dass auch andere Wissenschaften Beiträge zur 
Ökonomie leisten können. Auch wenn es noch Probleme gibt, können diese 
interdisziplinären Ansätze die Ökonomie bereichern.  
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